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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The last few years have shown a dramatic shift from speculating about futuristic 
technologies to making them a reality. One of the many areas under considerable development 
is autonomous vehicles (AVs). Google began testing AVs just a few years ago1 with Tesla, 
Ford, and Volvo following close behind, and already the vehicles are only a few short steps 
away from becoming commercially available. Making the technology a reality necessarily 
means tasking ourselves with ensuring our legal system is up to date. The testing phase in the 
USA has already seen several tragic accidents due to malfunctioning systems,2 leading to major 
discussions on liability and driver responsibility. More recently, testing has begun in the UK 
and it has become imperative that our legislation reflects the changes in technology. We must 
ask whether the law in its present form is equipped to handle the nuances which accompany 
autonomous vehicles.  
 
 
1.1: Background 
 
 Because there are many misconceptions about the capabilities of AVs, I will first briefly 
explain the technology in question before moving to the main questions to be addressed. There 
have been certain levels of automation in vehicles for decades; cruise control, the earliest form 
of automation, was introduced into vehicles in the 1950’s,3 so the world is no stranger to 
autonomous technology. Semi-autonomous technology has evolved in more recent years to 
include adaptive cruise control, self-parking systems and lane management assistance. 
However, all of these systems were designed to aid driving and ultimately a human has 
remained in control of the vehicle. AVs are not an all-or-nothing concept; a report from KPMG 
in 20154 contained the following diagram to demonstrate the different levels of automation 
encountered in vehicles: 
                                            
1 S. Gibbs, ‘Google to Begin Testing Purpose-Built Self-Driving Cars on Public Roads’, The Guardian, 15 May 
2015 
2 Yadron and Tynan, ‘Tesla Driver Dies in First Fatal Crash While Using Autopilot Mode’, The Guardian, 14 
July 2016; Kiss, ‘Tesla has No Plans to Disable Autopilot Mode as Third Recent Crash is Revealed’, 
The Guardian, 12 July 2016; Levin and Woolf, ‘Tesla Driver Killed While using Autopilot was 
Watching Harry Potter, Witness Says’, The Guardian, 1 July 2016 
3 Ioannou, ‘Autonomous Intelligent Cruise Control’ 4 November 1993 IEEE Transactions on Vehicular 
Technology, 42(4) 657 p.657 
4 KPMG, Connected and Autonomous Vehicles – The UK Economic Opportunity. March 2015 
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(Fig. 1.1) 
5  
Automation is a scale, and this diagram indicates that the new AVs are currently operating at 
an L3 level of automation. While it has been acknowledged that many of the legal issues would 
be solved by skipping the intermediate levels altogether and not use AVs on the road until they 
are L5,6 the reality is that producers of AVs are pushing for vehicles at L3 to be roadworthy 
and commercially available in the coming years. This means that we must ensure our legal 
system is equipped to handle the turbulent technology as it progresses towards L5, ensuring 
                                            
5 Ibid p.6. (notes from original source.) 
6 Science and Technology Select Committee, Connected and Autonomous Vehicles: The Future? (Connected 
and Autonomous Vehicles Report) 15 March 2017, Chapter 1, para.125 
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that we plan for the future, but without forgetting the concerns raised specifically by AVs at 
L3.  
 
Before broaching the question of whether the present law is appropriate, we must first 
ask: what is the present law? Product liability is currently governed by the Consumer Protection 
Act 1987 (CPA), substantiated with case law. The CPA was an implementation of the EC 
directive on liability for defective products,7 and followed two commissions in the UK, one 
established by Lord Pearson8 (the Pearson Commission) and the other a joint report by the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (Law Commission Report).9 The Law 
Commission Report noted in particular the push for better product liability regulation as a 
response to the consequences of the Thalidomide disaster.10 When considering the adequacy 
of claims against defective products, the Law Commission Report referenced Daniels and 
Daniels v. R. White & Sons Ltd. And Tarbard11 as an example of the remedies available at the 
time. This case involved a man and his wife claiming the manufacturer was negligent in 
allowing a bottle of lemonade to contain carbolic acid. It was held that the manufacturer only 
owed a duty to take reasonable care, a duty which was found to have been fulfilled. This case 
highlights the difficulties in pursuing a case outwith contractual remedies where products have 
fallen below standard. Where negligence must be shown, it must be proven that there has been 
a failure to take reasonable care- an onus which is hard to discharge in simple scenarios but 
becomes increasingly difficult with more complex products. The Law Commission Report 
noted this hurdle, commenting in particular that the consumer is “at a disadvantage in relation 
to access to the relevant evidence and scientific expertise, and this may be a real barrier to the 
initiation of an action on his part.”12 While it was clear at the time that putting the burden of 
proof on the consumer was challenging, it was also obvious that simply reversing this burden 
would raise similar evidentiary issues, and would still be a technical and difficult process.13 
The Law Commission Report stated that “the policy of the law should be to discourage 
                                            
7 Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products 
8 Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury. March 1978 
9 The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission. Liability for Defective Products. June 1977. 
10 Ibid para.3  
11 [1938] 4 All ER 258 
12 Law Commission Report para.29(e) 
13 Ibid para.34-37 
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unnecessary litigation”14 and this idea can be seen through the adoption of strict liability in the 
CPA. 
 
The CPA seeks to enforce, among other things, strict liability for defective products.15 
Under the legislation, the producer – or where the producer is not identified, the supplier – will 
be held liable16 if it is proven that there was a defect under the meaning in s.3 that cannot be 
absolved by the defences in s.4. The CPA considers a product to have a defect if “the safety of 
the product is not such as persons generally are entitled to expect,”17 taking account of certain 
factors, such as the marketing and reasonable use of the product.18 S.4 contains defences which, 
if met, will absolve the party of liability. Defences include complying with regulations, the 
defect not existing at the relevant time, or – most controversially – “the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer of products … might be 
expected to have discovered the defect.”19 Irrespective of the prior two sections, for an action 
to be within the remit of the legislation, the appropriate kind of damage must be done. S.5 of 
the CPA defines damage as “death or personal injury or any loss of or damage to any 
property,”20 however this does not include “damage to the product itself”21 or property not 
“ordinarily intended for private use.”22  
 
 Until recently, the CPA was the only legislation governing product liability, but it will 
remain in place to govern AVs. It has become clear that the present rules need to be 
reconsidered in light of the challenges brought by new technology. The UK Government has 
begun the consultation and legislation process to adapt the law for AVs, and while steps are 
being made, the progress is slow and there is still not much guidance. The first major 
consultation on driverless cars took place from July to September of 2016. The Pathway to 
Driverless Cars report was published by the Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles 
(The Pathway Report)23 and provides a fairly comprehensive discussion of the most pressing 
                                            
14 Ibid para.38(f) 
15 CPA s.2 
16 Ibid  
17 Ibid s.3(1) 
18 Ibid s.3(2) 
19 Ibid s.4 
20 Ibid s.5(1) 
21 Ibid s.5(2) 
22 Ibid s.5(3) 
23 Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles; Pathway to Driverless Cars: Proposals to support advanced 
driver assistance systems and automated vehicle technologies. July 2016 
 
 
8 
 
hurdles to overcome. While the consultation document covers a vast number of topics, those 
relevant to the present discussion are the comments on insurance. It noted that “where there is 
no human input at all, it would be easy to place liability on the manufacturer,”24 however there 
will be a time where, as the technology evolves, drivers will still be required to retake control. 
Because of these complexities, it calls for a re-examination of the insurance system to increase 
certainty in the event of accidents. In the government’s response to this consultation,25 
published in January 2017, it confirms its intention to pursue these changes, suggesting that the 
insurer would be liable to the driver or innocent third parties with the ability for the insurer to 
then recover the costs from the manufacturer with the presence of a defect. It suggests including 
defences where the driver has failed to install software updates or where there have been 
unauthorised modifications.26 The Science and Technology Select Committee reported in 
March 2017 on a similar set of questions, and echoed the sentiments from the previous reports, 
adding that these concerns would be considered in the Vehicle Technology and Aviation Bill 
(VTAB).27  
 
  Because of the dissolution of government in May 2017, the VTAB fell out of 
parliament and has not been reintroduced. Instead, the Automated and Electric Vehicles Bill 
(AEVB) was introduced on the 18th of October 2017 and received Royal Assent on the 25th of 
July in 2018, becoming the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act (AEVA). The AEVA 
accommodates the insurance proposals from the committee reports, creates specific provision 
for software updates, and restates the meaning of ‘damage’ in light of the CPA. While it is 
reassuring to see active steps towards properly regulating AVs, it remains to be seen whether 
these proposed changes to legislation will be as effective as initially thought. Indeed, the 
changes to insurance will be hugely beneficial as it removes the difficulties of litigation from 
the consumer; however, the act does not address a number of questions that are specific to 
product liability in general. It is to these questions that I now turn. 
 
 
 
                                            
24 The Pathway Report para.2.3 
25 Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles; Pathway to driverless cars: Proposals to support advanced 
driver assistance systems and automated vehicle technologies. Government Response. January 2017 
(“The Pathway Report Response”) 
26 The Pathway Report Response para.3.13 
27 Connected and Autonomous Vehicles Report Para.56 
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1.2: Thesis overview 
 
 This thesis seeks to address four broad concerns raised by AVs. The first is the way in 
which our perception of fault will affect our approach to AVs. There are two conflicting 
theories underlying delictual liability: loss and responsibility. These distinct approaches to 
fault result in a potential conflict of interest, and as AVs challenge our traditional tests of 
reasonableness as a method for ascribing liability, we need to consider how these theories 
impact our perception of fault and in turn how this impacts AVs. The added layers of 
software updates and an unclear expectation of the responsibilities resting on the user of the 
AV mean that our understanding of the role of fault in assessing liability is also on shaky 
ground. The second is the meaning of defect. The CPA appears to provide a sturdy definition 
of ‘defect’ on the surface, however a closer look at the case law highlights diverging opinions 
on the relevance and importance of consumer expectations in assessing the safety of a 
product. These discrepancies will create issues as the expectations surrounding AVs fluctuate 
with the successes and failures associated with a developing technology. Meeting the 
definition of “defective” in the CPA may have new complications that will require a 
reformulation or modified test. The third is the classification of property. The CPA enforces a 
distinction between private property and commercial property, with the result that each is 
governed by distinct rules for seeking compensation. However, with the rise of the shared 
economy this line has become blurred. The introduction of companies such as Uber means 
that individuals are using their personal vehicles for commercial purposes, and in the future, 
this may extend to AVs. Whether the distinction between private and commercial is still 
justifiable in these circumstances must be discussed. The fourth is the scientific defence. This 
defence is designed to allow manufacturers to escape liability should the requisite 
requirements of lacking knowledge and discoverability be met, however the few cases 
discussing these issues suggest that the defence operates more strictly than is usable. 
Furthermore, given that the defence was not a mandatory element of the EU directive, some 
have suggested the defence be removed altogether. It is unclear whether these calls have any 
standing, or moreover what contribution AVs can make to this debate. 
 
These four issues will be addressed as follows: Chapter 2 will unpack the boundaries 
of fault in attributing liability, with a focus on loss and responsibility in turn; Chapter 3 will 
address the definition of defect; Chapter 4 will look at the distinction between private and 
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commercial property; and Chapter 5 will comment on the role of the scientific defence. These 
chapters focus on substantial issues found in the CPA that will affect our approach to legislating 
for AVs. They involve questions of the adaptability of the present law. The paper will ground 
itself in the CPA as its primary source of legislation, with case law, the AEVA, and the 
government discussions as supplements. These sources will provide the foundation for 
legislating AVs now in their developmental stages, and in the future, as they are integrated. It 
must be a priority that our concerns with the law are considered now to ensure the law does not 
fall behind. While much of the debate will be informed by insurance questions and ethical 
concerns, the thesis will focus specifically on the appropriateness of the CPA. Questions 
relating to insurance and ethics will not be discussed here. It may be that many of the concerns 
raised in this paper are in fact not concerns when examined in more detail, however the 
questions must be asked before conclusions can be drawn. In conducting this review of the 
present product liability laws in the UK, it is not my purpose to suggest how to overcome these 
issues, but simply to highlight where, if at all, the gaps exist, and thereby to contribute to the 
continuous improvement of the law.  
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Chapter 2: Locating the Fault Boundary 
 
 At its most basic iteration, one can only be held responsible for one’s own action or 
inaction. While this simple model must be expanded to incorporate various spheres of influence 
such as property or businesses, it remains, at its core, a simple concept. If I am responsible for 
A (be it my body, my property, my product) and A causes harm to B, then I am responsible for 
the harm. This is the foundation of the law of negligence. While the concept is straightforward, 
its application is far from it. Issues of causation complicate the fault principle as competing 
parties seek to absolve themselves of liability by proving that the harm was in fact caused by 
another. This process is not always practical, and the UK has discussed whether negligence is 
actually the best solution for compensating for harm caused. Indeed, this was one of a number 
of concerns raised during the Pearson Commission and while negligence was not abandoned, 
the commission called for the implementation of certain strict liability schemes in an effort to 
reduce uncertainty.  
 
The debate between negligence and strict liability highlights one of the fundamental 
issues underlying fault: loss and responsibility. Each represents a distinct approach to 
compensation. A focus on loss values compensating the damage sustained, no more, no less, 
whereas a focus on responsibility values ensuring blame is placed appropriately and holding 
people to account for their actions. Both the debate between loss and responsibility and between 
negligence and strict liability have relevance to the AV movement. Because AVs are products 
they fall under the CPA’s strict liability scheme, however even strict liability schemes do not 
abandon the concept of fault altogether. The user of the AV still has responsibility until the 
vehicles become fully autonomous with no monitoring required. This added layer of potential 
fault will complicate claims as we balance user responsibility with defective products. The way 
these claims are handled will be affected by whether we choose to favour compensating loss 
or enforcing responsibility. In an attempt to answer these questions this chapter will discuss 
three things. First, it will look briefly at the debate between loss and responsibility as they relate 
to fault in order to understand these delictual theories and their relevance to AVs. Second, it 
will highlight some of the difficulties which may arise if we do not have a clear understanding 
of the relevance of fault, through consideration of the provisions in the AVEA pertaining to 
software updates. Finally, it will discuss the responsibilities of the operator, with a 
consideration of how reasonable behaviour will affect questions of fault.  
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2.1: Theories of delictual liability 
 
 I begin this chapter with a brief detour into the theoretical foundations for negligence. 
While I want to remain primarily focussed on an assessment of the current law, no 
consideration of the appropriateness and effectiveness of a rule would be complete without first 
asking why it has been implemented in the way that it has. Stapleton captures the necessity of 
this when she states that theory “must also be able to explain where all the boundaries of the 
rule lie and why they need to be there.”28 When we ask the question ‘are the laws in the UK 
sufficient to integrate autonomous vehicles?’ we are necessarily asking ‘where are the current 
boundaries of the law? If they are not wide enough can we justify expanding them to include 
this new technology, or can we provide an explanation as to why the boundaries must remain 
in place?’ To answer these questions, we must understand why the law has been structured in 
the way that it has, and the answers to this lie in theory. It is possible that I will raise more 
questions than I will answer, since fully exploring the theory is simply not possible here. My 
goal is to locate the sources of conflict within the theory of delict to highlight why these are 
relevant to the present law and how they can impact our approach to AVs.  
 
 As I have mentioned before, there are two underlying theories in delict: loss and 
responsibility. Each of these have correlating concepts which contribute to our perception of 
fault; loss relates to economics, and responsibility relates to personhood. Let us begin with 
responsibility. Responsibility stems from the idea that freedom is the fundamental necessity of 
society. Owen explains: 
 
“the freedom concept rests upon the notion of free will – the capacity of 
persons rationally to select personal goals and plans for life, and their 
possession of means to achieve those ends… freedom accords persons dignity, 
for it permits each human to design and then to follow his own life plan, 
distinct from any other.”29 
 
                                            
28 Stapleton. Product Liability. (1994, Butterworth) P.96 
29 Owen, ‘Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law’ in Owen, Ed. Philosophical Foundations of Tort 
Law. (1995, Clarendon Press) 201 p.203 
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The concept of dignity through free will derives from Kant’s theories of personhood. In his 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains that “everything has either a price 
or a dignity.”30 Things which have a price can be replaced with things which are equivalent, 
however things which are “elevated above all price” have dignity, where dignity is an inner 
worth and price is a relative worth.31 He elaborates that “autonomy is thus the ground of the 
dignity of the human and of every rational nature (emphasis excluded).”32 This creates a picture 
where, because humans are rational beings capable of autonomy, we have dignity; and because 
we have dignity, we must be respected and treated as an end (someone with inner worth), and 
not treated as a means (someone with relative worth). Kant’s theory can be summarised with 
the simple statement that a rational being must “treat itself and all others never merely as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end in itself.”33 Owen explains that for Kant, truth is 
the ideal that everyone ought to possess, and that intentionally causing harm is a subversion of 
the truth.34 Harm is a subversion of the truth because it relies upon converting an autonomous 
free individual into an object of harm, thus treating them as a means. Accidental harm can also 
be classified as a subversion of truth because it is a failure to “possess the truth concerning the 
things that caused the harm.”35 What all of this means is that in harming people we are failing 
to respect their dignity as rational agents and their right to choose for themselves, because the 
act of causing harm means using them as means to our own ends. This understanding 
demonstrates the importance of personal responsibility to a theory of freedom. Kant would 
hold anyone responsible for not respecting other rational agents as ends in themselves. We can 
observe this theory play out in our theory of delict because of the importance we place on a 
mutual respect for each other as autonomous individuals. 
 
 A connected theory is the libertarian argument, otherwise known as a theory of absolute 
liability. Perry explains this theory as one where if I choose to act in this world, then any 
consequence derived from my actions, good or bad, is mine alone.36 This is similar to the 
responsibility we see in Kant, where I am free to choose how to act, but if I choose to use other 
human beings as a means to my ends, I must suffer the negative consequences from that choice. 
                                            
30 Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. And Trans. Allen W. Wood, (2002, Yale UP) P.52 
31 Ibid  
32 Ibid p.54 
33 Ibid p.51 
34 Owen. ‘Philosophical Foundations of Fault’ p.204-5 
35 Ibid p.205 
36 Perry. ‘Risk, Harm, and Responsibility’ in Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law. 321 p.340 
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While this sounds quite appealing and indeed quite straightforward, Perry suggests this concept 
has problems. He feels this is too narrow a view of liability because it assumes, similarly to 
Kant, that harm is always the result of one action upon a passive party.37 Instead Perry believes 
that harm is caused by the interaction of two active parties, active in the sense that they are 
both engaging in some activity.38 He demonstrates this with a scenario: 
 
“the injury that results when a motorist ‘runs down’ a pedestrian should not be 
regarded as having been caused by one person acting unilaterally upon 
another, but rather as the upshot of two decisions to act: the motorist’s decision 
to drive when, where and how she did, and the pedestrian’s decision to walk 
when, where and how he did.”39 
 
This criticism shows that harm is not always as simple as seeking to place responsibility on 
one party. It often involves actions on both sides and from other third parties, all of whom may 
or may not have contributed to the harm with varying degrees of responsibility.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum however, an irresponsible act may not lead to any 
damage caused. This is our first inconsistency with the freedom theory. While Kant would 
want to hold responsible anyone who disrespected another’s rational agency to achieve his own 
end, how this is enforced becomes tricky when one looks at responsibility alone. The boundary 
between causing harm and not causing harm seems definitive enough, however it does not 
consider the risk of harm. Perry discusses whether this risk of harm is a form of damage in its 
own right. He opens his discussion with the difference between objective risk and epistemic 
risk. Objective risk is based on a definitive probability, i.e. the likelihood of a certain event 
occurring, whereas epistemic risk is causally related, looking at deterministic and 
indeterministic actions.40 We can see the relevance of epistemic risk play out when the question 
of foreseeability is addressed in the negligence test,41 but how has the law addressed objective 
risk? Objective risk often finds itself in the centre of medical negligence cases, however this 
                                            
37 Ibid p.342 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid p.342-3 
40 Ibid p.330-3 
41 See Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 p.580 for a discussion on foreseeability 
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has normally been in the context of adequately informing patients of risks.42 Because these 
cases have framed the issue of risk in terms of patient consent, the failure to alert the patients 
to the objective risk in each scenario has been actionable under negligence. They have not 
raised the question of the risk itself being actionable.43  
 
Perry introduces the case of Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority44 to discuss 
the question of whether the risk itself is an actionable harm. In this case the question to the 
court was whether the increased risk of avascular necrosis created by a delay in treatment was 
actionable. While initially an award was made, it was reversed on appeal because of a failure 
to provide sufficient causal connection between the delay in treatment and the damage 
sustained. It was held that the likelihood of developing the condition was incredibly likely prior 
to the delay, and that there was little impact made from not treating immediately. The court, 
unhelpfully, decided this case was not the time to discuss whether a loss of chance could 
constitute a form of damages because of the difficulties in establishing causation.45 While it is 
understandable that it is not the court’s responsibility to engage in a hypothetical discussion of 
the scope of a claim for loss of chance when it does not bear any relevance to the case presented 
to them, it does not leave us any more enlightened. Perry carries this hypothetical discussion 
in his article, noting an important distinction between treatable and untreatable cases as it 
relates to a loss of chance. He notes that if the injury sustained was treatable, it is feasible that 
in addition to the physical harm created by delaying treatment there was some kind of ‘risk 
damage’ caused. However, if the injury was untreatable, it makes no difference whether the 
treatment was prompt or delayed because it is hard to say that any damage would have been 
caused at all.46 This distinction is interesting because it links responsibility to causing harm for 
determining legal liability. If the injury was untreatable, then the fact that there is a 
misdiagnosis or any other negligent behaviour is entirely irrelevant because there is no legally 
                                            
42 See, for example, Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital 
and others [1985] 1 AC 871; Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] PIQR P53; Chester 
v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41; Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (General Medical Council 
intervening) [2015] UKSC 11 
43 Chester v Afshar is a slight exception to this generalisation, where the question to the court was whether the 
patient could claim damages for losing the chance to decide when to have the surgery, and the lack of 
information prevented this choice. However, while there was more discussion about the merits of 
losing an opportunity to choose, this loss was still tied to the duty to obtain informed consent and so 
was never raised as an independent action. 
44 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] AC 750 
45 Ibid p.782-3 
46 Perry, ‘Risk, Harm and Responsibility’ p.334 
 
 
16 
 
perceived harm created by the act. The decision in Hotson was upheld in Gregg v Scott, where 
a 25% reduction of the chance of survival due to a misdiagnosis was not seen as a sufficient 
contribution to the patient’s condition, so it could not be established that the doctor’s 
negligence created loss of a chance of survival.47 Perry’s comments on treatable and untreatable 
conditions can be seen in this case, where the decision turned on whether an accurate treatment 
would have made a difference to the patient’s condition, giving more credibility to the idea that 
harm must result from the negligence and not simply the possibility of harm.  
 
How does this bear on our theory of freedom and responsibility? It appears to create a 
lucky escape: if we are to reap the consequences of our actions, but by chance our negative 
actions do not cause harm, we are not seen to be liable to anyone. This makes Perry’s criticism 
of the libertarian theory even more persuasive because irresponsibility, in the legal sense, 
requires two parties. Negligence is a concept which is attached to harm. So, while the freedom 
theory and the concept of responsibility is pivotal in our understanding of delict, it alone does 
not answer all of our questions. A focus exclusively on responsibility would not create the 
theory of delict that we presently understand, since a theory focussed on responsibility alone 
would hold individuals liable for irresponsible acts without necessarily causing harm. Hotson 
is a clear example of attempting to push the boundary of responsibility towards this picture by 
creating the idea of ‘risk damage’, where the creation of an opportunity to suffer harm is 
sufficient to hold an individual to account. However, the fact that this case did not succeed on 
its claim suggests that our theory of delict has more to it than merely enforcing responsibility.  
 
The other major theory of delict roots itself in economics. Stapleton has written at 
length on law and economics, with particular regard to product liability. She writes after the 
introduction of strict liability for products and explains the roots that this legislative decision 
has in law and economics. This theory focuses less on the morality of who is responsible and 
why, and instead seeks to enforce responsibility through placing the burden of costs onto the 
relevant party. When focusing on the costs, it is not important who is at fault, but rather who is 
best equipped to compensate when harm occurs. One such method Stapleton discusses is price 
deterrence. This suggests that the risks created by products should be internalised, meaning the 
price of the product will account for the dangers or harmful effects, should any arise.48 Under 
                                            
47 Gregg v Scott [2002] EWCA Civ 1471 
48 Stapleton. Product Liability. P.101-2 
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a strict liability scheme this means that if a product should be found to be defective, the 
producer can compensate for the harm caused because it has essentially levied the cost of the 
damages through a small increase in the product’s price. This method is a clear demonstration, 
however, that responsibility has little bearing on a theory of economics. If a product is defective 
it is because of some fault on behalf of the producer, and yet the method of providing 
compensation essentially derives from the paying customer. Notwithstanding, this makes sense 
economically: using a product comes with a certain risk, so it is justifiable to pay a higher price 
to ensure I can be fairly compensated if said risk materialises.  
 
Another method Stapleton raises is the cheapest cost avoider. This theory suggests that 
the burden of ensuring a product is safe should rest on whoever can do so most cheaply. In 
most cases, this will be the producer.49 But, once again, this cost can be internalised and 
distributed over the consumers. On the surface these methods seem to give very little weight 
to the idea of moral responsibility. Yet, economic theories of liability would suggest that moral 
responsibility is irrelevant in creating a system of legal liability. Perhaps on the philosophical 
level it is acceptable to speak of ‘should’ and ‘ought’, but for creating practical enforceable 
rules, economics contains the answers. The difficulty with this attitude is understanding all 
social costs in monetary terms. Meeting the expectations that products are safe to use is a value 
that is not easily quantifiable. How much is a safe society worth? Economists would suggest 
this will be determined by the market, but on a moral level, safety is invaluable. To suggest 
that there is a definitive cost that can be placed on the value of someone’s life, or their freedom 
from harm, is akin to forgoing human dignity.  
 
When it comes to quantifying damages, everything boils down to an economic 
consideration. Owen notes that “a person’s worth is measured to a large extent by his 
productivity which, in turn, is conveniently (if imperfectly) measured by the market.”50 We 
calculate damages by determining wages lost while in recovery, hinderances to earnings 
potential, expenses incurred, property damage lost, and a number of other monetary expenses. 
There is considerable difficulty in quantifying ‘hurt feelings’, the only non-economic loss 
successfully sought. How do you quantify a feeling? A purely economic focus does not allow 
claims to properly account for other types of loss because we do not have a way to 
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conceptualise them and adequately compensate them. Yet awards of solatium are frequently 
made, giving weight to the idea that we do value harms which are not always quantifiable in 
economic terms. Despite the difficulties solatium creates for economics, harms without a 
quantifiable loss in some capacity do not create a legal liability. We can observe this in the 
reluctance of the courts to give awards for the loss of a chance or an increased risk. Without a 
tangible damage sustained there is no legal claim.  
 
It is clear that neither the responsibility theory nor the loss theory adequately covers all 
elements of our theory of delict as we understand it. We do not focus solely on enforcing 
responsibility, nor do we consider only those harms which can be understood by economics. 
Hedley stresses the danger of focusing on one theory alone. He states:  
 
“acceptance of their theories represents a significant narrowing of legal vision, 
making debate on reforms difficult indeed. To think that any one perspective 
on law is uniquely correct is inevitably narrowing. A rigorous focus on 
economic costs and benefits encourages lawyers to forget that many costs and 
benefits are not economic at all. And a focus on law as corrective justice 
encourages lawyers to forget that there are other sorts of justice.”51 
 
A theory of responsibility does not reflect our requirement to provide a tangible harm in order 
to successfully claim damage, and a theory of loss does not adequately account for non-
economic considerations. However, elements of both these theories are clearly present in our 
understanding of delictual liability. Following Hedley’s warning is sensible; amalgamating 
these two distinct theories into one allows for weight to be given to dignity, safety and seeking 
the individual responsible for the loss, while having a quantifiable method of understanding 
the value of the harm and allowing the producer to spread the cost of harm over all its products.  
 
 This section has provided an overview of the two main avenues of conflict in our 
theories of delictual liability. They demonstrate distinct approaches to compensation which, as 
Hedley suggests, are better viewed together. Responsibility and loss are not always at odds 
with each other; they each provide a unique perspective on the most appropriate way to 
determine liability and compensate harm. We can see that our negligence rules still 
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predominantly focus on responsibility while our strict liability rules take a more economical 
approach. AVs, however, will challenge this divide. Road traffic accidents, while covered by 
insurance, are still handled by a negligence regime. AVs will obviously be an integral part of 
the road traffic laws but are simultaneously treated as products and will be subjected to the 
strict liability scheme. There is no fundamental issue with this, however it creates the potential 
for overlap in some areas and gaps in others. The following sections will look at two such 
examples. First, the provisions in the AEVA relating to software updates create an area which 
is governed by insurance law, product liability, and negligence. It will be important to ensure 
a consistent approach across these three regimes to avoid confusion. Second, there is no clear 
understanding of what the user’s duties presently are, and while it may be assumed that the 
rules of negligence and the ‘reasonable man’ would guide our understanding, there is no 
precedent in the law for operating a self-driving vehicle and we must be careful not to create a 
void in the law.   
  
 
2.2: Software updates and the AEVA 
 
 The only dedicated piece of legislation we have for self-driving cars is the AEVA. 
Following the proposals from the “Pathway Report,”52 the AEVA states that insurers will be 
liable where accidents are caused by AVs.53 This is an extension of the insurance regime to 
cover product liability, providing immediate compensation to victims while the insurers pursue 
recovery for liability separately. This liability is constrained by the AEVA, which provides that 
the insurance policies may exclude or limit liability if the accident was the result of prohibited 
software alterations or a failure to install safety-critical software updates.54 There are two points 
of concern raised by the AEVA. First, its definition of ‘safety-critical’ creates a potential 
problem with our understanding of defect; and second, the fault elements of the insurance 
policy will mean a potentially lengthy process prior to compensation, reversing the intentions 
of the insurance regime.  
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 The AEVA defines a software update as ‘safety-critical’ if “it would be unsafe to use 
the vehicle in question without the update being installed.”55 The difficulty with this is that the 
way in which the definition is worded creates tension with our definition of defect. While we 
will consider the definition of defect in more depth in Chapter 3, in general, we understand the 
definition of defect to be where the product does not meet the level of safety that the public is 
entitled to expect. By framing the ‘safety-critical’ updates as those which are necessary for the 
safety of the vehicle, we are associating the vehicles prior to updates with defectiveness. 
Software updates can parallel product recalls in a sense; the update will correct any prior errors 
or further refine the technology, and similarly a product recall is an acknowledgment that the 
product is faulty or incorrect in some way and requires fixing. However, the existence of a 
recall or an update will not make the prior product defective. The CPA notes that the product 
must be considered ‘at the relevant time,’56 restricting our ability to compare new products with 
old products. So, while the definition of ‘safety-critical update’ sounds like it could hint at 
elements of defectiveness, we must read new laws in line with prior established law. Updates 
do present a challenge to our understanding of a product. Are the AVs pre-update and the AVs 
post-update separate products? There is no definitive answer to that question. Additionally, the 
ruling in Boston Scientific57 may create further difficulties. It was established in this case that 
a product could be considered defective by virtue of it belonging to a “defective product 
group.”58 If we find that AVs pre- and post-update are the same product, then they will be 
classified as being part of the same product group. The existence of an update means there is 
now an increased risk on the products which have not been updated, potentially leading to a 
finding that they are defective. While the definition in the AEVA is not a problem per se, it 
does create an avenue for further questions surrounding defectiveness as it relates to software 
updates which, for the time being, remain unanswered. 
 
 A more pressing issue perhaps is the elements of fault retained in the AEVA as it relates 
to insurance coverage. Insurers have the ability to limit their liability where the accident was 
the result of prohibited software alterations or a failure to update the software.59 There is a clear 
causation requirement to be established here. The exclusion will only operate if it can be proved 
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that the accident was a direct result of the alteration or failure to update. This is consistent 
(albeit slightly stricter) with established Insurance law, where insurers may not rely on non-
compliance if it is established that the non-compliance did not increase the risk of the loss.60 
However, proving this will become complicated incredibly quickly because of the 
technological complexities. Wright discusses that modern-day litigation is increasingly 
complicated because it is scientifically complex, relying on experiments and statistical 
analysis.61 There are many components already involved in proving causation, exacerbated by 
the involvement of pioneering technology and the uncertainty which surrounds it. It would 
have to be established that the update would have prevented the accident, and that the software 
prior to the update was the cause of the accident.  
 
 Further to the scientific complexity is the difficulty in finding the line between 
association and causation. It may be easy to see a failure to update software and a subsequent 
accident as being related, however there are so many components to the AV technology, it may 
be quite unlikely that the specific part of the software to be updated was actually the cause of 
the accident. Goldberg raises the case of Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v Havner,62 a Texan 
case, where it was stated that “there may in fact be no causal relationship even if the relative 
risk is high.”63 Goldberg uses this case to explain that association does not always mean 
causation.64 We must be careful that the two are not conflated. If we are truly judging things 
based on causation, then it is not enough to say that there is a risk. Indeed, s.11 of the Insurance 
Act echoes this caution where it prevents the exclusion of liability if it can be proved that the 
non-compliance did not increase the risk. Applying that same test to the rule in the AEVA, 
insurers can only limit or exclude liability if the insured fails to prove that not updating the 
software did not contribute materially to the accident.  
 
 One question which comes to mind is why this duty rests on the consumer when the 
reason the update is necessary is because the product is not up to standard. Here we can see the 
conflict between responsibility and economics play out. The responsibility theories would tell 
us the manufacturer has the duty to ensure his products function, which means ensuring the 
                                            
60 Insurance Act 2015 s.11 
61 Wright, ‘Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief’ in Goldberg, ed. Perspectives on Causation. (2011, 
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62 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Havner 953 SW 2d 706 (Tex 1997) 
63 Ibid p.718 
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software is up to date, however the economics theory tells us that is impractical because it is 
the consumer who can most easily ensure the product is up to date by installing any updates 
himself. This may seem unfair. The consumer is not responsible for the safety of the product, 
so why should he be responsible if the update is not completed immediately or correctly? And 
what if it is impractical to undergo the update immediately? It may take time, the owner may 
be away, the car may be in someone else’s possession. If we are to assume the ‘cheapest cost 
avoider’ approach here is sound, surely it would not be unjust to require manufacturers to 
design the cars to automatically update themselves overnight when they are not in use, therefore 
removing the opportunity to fail to update the software. It would make little difference to the 
design of the vehicle to impose this requirement and would not unduly burden the 
manufacturers. Automatic updates are already a commonplace concept in technology, and it 
would make sense both under the responsibility and economic theories to enforce this with 
AVs. It ensures the highest level of safety possible with minimal scope for intermittent product 
failures due to delays in updates and increases the certainty of the legal position by removing 
one hurdle on the way to compensation.  
 
 
2.3: Reasonable driving behaviour 
 
 New technology brings changes and for AVs many aspects of our current road traffic 
laws must adjust. While AVs remain only partially autonomous with the potential for driver 
input, clear definitions will be required, and responsibilities clarified. Syed notes that presently 
there are no statutory definitions of ‘driving’ or ‘driver’, nor the term ‘in charge’.65 Before 
autonomous technology it would have been obvious who was driving the car so having a 
definition would not have been necessary, however the introduction of two potential sources 
of control in the vehicle – the software and the human ‘user’ – may require us to make changes 
to the Road Traffic Act (RTA) to ensure clarity. Aside from these preliminary questions of 
definitions, there are other questions of responsibility for the user of the AV. It has not been 
established what duties, if any, rest upon the user. This question has caused friction in the US, 
where several accidents have turned into disputes about fault. Tesla stated in 2015 that “the 
driver is still responsible for, and ultimately in control of, the car.”66 This may not remain the 
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case now and into the future, however no indication has been given that this policy has changed. 
Indeed, Tesla has stated that the system is supposed to remind drivers to keep their hands on 
the wheel67 and that not having their hands on the wheel is contrary to the system’s terms of 
use.68 Presently, the only guidance in the UK can be found in the RTA, where there are 
references to a ‘competent and careful driver,’69 and provisions for drivers to maintain ‘proper 
control’ of the vehicle.70 While this is a helpful start, these terms lose their context when the 
concept of ‘driving’ no longer exists and the meaning of ‘control’ changes. To add to the 
murkiness, many people will not understand how to properly use the vehicle. It may not be 
obvious how to engage or disengage autopilot, and any manual monitoring that is required may 
not be completed properly due to a lack of technical knowledge. Users may not understand the 
limits of the software so will not be alert to potential problems. There have been suggestions 
that driving tests be altered to ensure that individuals fully understand how to operate the 
vehicles.71 This will never resolve all issues, but it is a simple way of ensuring that users are 
receiving uniform training prior to operating AVs.  
 
 A lack of clarity not only raises regulatory questions, it also creates further 
complications when assessing fault. While the vehicles have the capacity to be in autonomous 
mode or to be under the user’s control, accidents may result in “increased friction between the 
different parties over who and what caused the collision, resulting in delays in compensation 
to victims.”72 The government acknowledges the potential difficulties created by this unique 
period during the development process, and these complications hint towards moving these 
questions away from a fault-based regime to overcome these issues. Despite this, the 
government still believes a fault-based approach is the best approach.73 This claim makes little 
sense considering the difficulties raised just paragraphs earlier. The extra uncertainty created 
by the varying levels of autonomy strengthens calls to move AVs away from negligence.  
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In the Personal Injuries Bar Association Annual Lecture, Lord Sumption JSC discussed 
the utilitarian approach to compensation. He stated that “from a purely utilitarian point of view, 
if the cost of compensating people for personal injury falls on society at large, there is no 
rational reason to distinguish between personal injury which has been caused by someone’s 
fault, and personal injury which has occurred without fault.”74 Whether we choose to accept a 
utilitarian approach to compensation or not, it raises an interesting point. The utilitarian model 
would choose to see no difference between fault-based injuries and injuries without fault. This 
abandons negligence altogether for the sake of maximising the common good. It is a shocking 
difference in approach to our current road traffic scheme, but perhaps the claim is not as 
outlandish as it first appears. Waldron highlights this dilemma with the story of ‘Fate, Fortune 
and Hurt’.75 The scenario he derives is as follows: Two drivers, Fate and Fortune, are driving 
down the same road and both see an advertisement in a shop window for discounted shoes. 
Both look at the shop window while driving, temporarily distracted by the lure of a sale. In 
Fortune’s case, the moment passes without incident and he continues driving. Fate, however, 
is not so lucky. He fails to notice a motorcyclist, Hurt, in front of him and, distracted, he crashes 
into Hurt, seriously injuring him. Setting insurance aside, Fate is responsible for the accident 
and will be required to compensate Hurt for his moment of carelessness. Fortune, with the same 
moment of carelessness, is not held responsible for anything.  
 
Waldron’s story demonstrates quite clearly that negligence is dependent on there being 
a loss. For that reason, it is hard to focus on responsibility alone. With such strong evidence 
that negligence does turn on the damage, why do we focus so heavily on responsibility? We 
have developed several standards of reasonableness for individuals,76 land owners,77 doctors,78 
and manufacturers79 to name a few. And yet the standard of responsibility is just that: it is one 
of reasonableness. The law does not expect individuals to be perfect and will only hold certain 
mishaps to account. What the categories listed above demonstrate is a special standard of care 
for certain groups of people. The law requires a higher standard of care for individuals in these 
positions because we attach a higher level of responsibility to these groups. But the higher level 
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of responsibility derives from having proximity with those who would potentially be harmed. 
Thus, where there is not adequate proximity, there is no duty of care.80 Even within these 
groups there is case law to suggest that lapses or moments of carelessness are not sufficient to 
fail the standard of reasonableness. McGowan v W & JR Watson held that a momentary lapse 
on behalf of the employer did not demonstrate a lack of reasonable care.81 While we expect 
drivers to exercise caution while operating a vehicle, we cannot expect perfection; momentary 
lapses, such as the one both Fate and Fortune displayed, will not automatically create liability.  
 
From this perspective, however, there appears to be inconsistency in the application of 
these standards of reasonableness. The law may say that moments of carelessness are tolerable, 
but the law will simultaneously punish Fate for his carelessness and not Fortune. One answer 
to this apparent inequity is simply that the carelessness creates the potential for harm and by 
acting carelessly you are exposing yourself to the danger of causing another individual harm. 
This is not a particularly satisfactory answer. By that logic any activity which could potentially 
cause danger to oneself or another should be avoided to ensure there is no risk of accumulating 
liability. As we will explore further in Chapter 3, society cannot be risk free and we must accept 
the possibility of harm. The only satisfactory answer to why we punish Fate and not Fortune is 
simply that responsibility is not the priority. Williams and Hepple explain: 
 
“Liability for negligence is not synonymous with moral blameworthiness. One 
the one hand, some of those who are at fault escape liability because of the 
absence of a legal duty; on the other hand, the morally innocent may be 
condemned to pat enormous sums by way of damages. This is because the 
standard of care of the ‘reasonable man’ is today applied indiscriminately to a 
wide range of human errors – such as momentary lack of attention or an 
unfortunate reaction to danger. It has been estimated that the average motorist 
commits one error every two miles he drives, if one of these errors results in 
damage to another’s person or property the motorist is legally negligent. A 
split-second’s thoughtlessness may result in civil liability in both traffic and 
industrial accidents. Here the theory that liability is based upon fault bears 
little resemblance to reality.”82 
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It is clear that although negligence must involve a discussion of responsibility to ensure there 
is sufficient proximity between the injured and injurer, it is a relatively superficial concept. 
There is no real sense of fault beyond a (sometimes loose) causal connection and the necessity 
of damage means that fault is only held to account arbitrarily. From this perspective, perhaps 
the utilitarian idea of compensation isn’t so obscene. This model will become more relevant as 
AVs become more competent. At this point in the process where there is still the capacity for 
human fault we may find it difficult to let go of the negligence model we have used for so long. 
However, as AVs become more independent and require less monitoring, what scope is there 
for fault? It is the picture of the future that all vehicles will be autonomous and there will be no 
human input. It is time to consider that the need for a negligence regime on our roads is coming 
to an end.  
 
 
2.4: Conclusion 
 
 Negligence is a multifaceted regime and it has become apparent throughout this chapter 
that it is not always clear which of the competing interests ought to be most favourable. The 
two underlying concepts of loss and responsibility create a tension between holding individuals 
to account for their actions and ensuring that any damage is adequately compensated. It would 
seem that the current picture of negligence does involve a balance between these two ideas, 
ensuring that loss is compensated when it can be traced to a responsible individual. There are 
also questions of responsibility surrounding software updates. The AEVA’s definition of 
‘safety-critical’ updates may unintentionally imply that vehicles which have not undergone 
updates are defective, and we must approach these definitions carefully. Using a law and 
economics theory it may be most efficient to require AVs to automatically update, removing 
the potential to avoid updates. This would ensure that the vehicles are always operating as 
safely as possible while simultaneously preventing an easily avoidable error on the user’s part. 
 
Road traffic accidents create a unique predicament because the moments of 
irresponsibility are often not acts which would fall short of the reasonableness standards that 
negligence establishes. We see that some moments of carelessness slip by unnoticed, while 
others can be catastrophic. This uncertainty suggests it may be time to implement a no-fault 
scheme and abandon negligence in this sphere. With the rise of AVs and the reduction of human 
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input, this suggestion will become increasingly persuasive. For the moment, the weaknesses of 
the negligence regime need to be acknowledged. During the coming years of transition between 
human drivers and AVs, a revised system may be necessary. Fault claims will only become 
more complicated with the potential for both machine and human sources of error. Neither 
product liability nor negligence alone will adequately address the issues. While there are no 
major clashes between these two regimes, we will need to be careful moving forward to 
guarantee that appropriate standards are being enforced. Caution must be exercised to ensure 
we are not asking too much of either humans or machines.  
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Chapter 3: The Meaning of Defect 
 
Now we have explored the elements of fault which will inform the way we approach 
negligence and product liability, we can begin exploring the CPA in more depth to understand 
the current legislative position. The first step to a successful product liability claim is proving 
the existence of a defect. What is a rather obvious requirement and, on the surface, a relatively 
straightforward one, has become more obscure as technology has developed. The CPA began 
with a simple claim that products which did not meet the public’s expectation of safety would 
be regarded as defective83 and yet, as technology has progressed this phrase has evolved into a 
complex question. There is no set method for ascertaining the public’s expectation, nor is there 
a guide for what constitutes ‘safe’. Further, there have been – and will continue to be – issues 
with the burden of proof.  
 
 Before these questions can be explored, however, we must understand the context. The 
case law deriving from this short provision in the CPA is murky and at times contradictory. 3.1 
will discuss the evolution of the meaning of ‘defect’ under the CPA and its case law to highlight 
the main locations of complication, exploring where the natural flexibility created in the CPA 
test has resulted in a lack of clarity from the courts. I will then move to discuss the main issues 
found in the defect test. In 3.2, I will analyse the burden of proof. There are discrepancies with 
what level of proof is required, and further still what issues need to be proven for a successful 
claim. I will highlight the key cases which are responsible for the inconsistency and what effect 
this may have moving forwards with AVs. 3.3 will look in depth at assessing expectations. 
While proving the defect is fundamental, the expectations are the essence of determining what 
constitutes a defect. I will analyse the case law to find a spectrum of expectations utilised in 
claims under the CPA. Many of these cases centre their discussions on the idea of risk. An 
assessment of risk as it relates to an expectation of safety will be provided to illuminate the 
case law in this area, with the goal of demonstrating the inherent uncertainty contained within 
a flexible test and a conundrum raised by the natural complexity and uncertainty with emerging 
technologies. To finish this chapter, 3.4 will consider two final concerns with this test. The first 
relates to products which do not themselves have a defect but are part of a product series with 
an increased risk of a defect. The second concerns the decision making necessary by AVs and 
the resulting ethical dilemma arising from the way in which these decisions will, or should, be 
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taken. I will conclude by assessing where the law currently stands with regards to AVs to 
determine what weaknesses are present in light of their upcoming implementation.  
 
 
3.1: The CPA and subsequent case law 
 
 We start in 1987 with the enactment of the CPA, which states that a product is defective 
if the safety of the product is not what “persons generally are entitled to expect.”84 The 
legislation offers marginal insight for the meaning of this test, listing marketing and reasonable 
use as factors to consider when determining expected safety,85 but beyond these simple 
guidelines there is nothing. Neither the directive nor the Law Commission Report, published 
prior to the CPA, provide any explanation beyond the words found in the CPA to aid in our 
interpretation. Before the CPA or directive were created, the Pearson Commission described 
the rationale for creating a strict liability test as one which places responsibility on the 
producers to provide safe goods and on the consumers to use products with care,86 which, 
although helpful, does little to guide the courts further in determining what constitutes a 
satisfactory level of safety. The directive and CPA, however, construed the test in such a way 
so as to allow flexibility in its application, appreciating the variety of circumstances to which 
the formula would apply. And indeed, the rise of AVs is certainly a novel circumstance that 
requires a flexible application. In all the documents currently produced by the Government 
regarding AVs,87 none have suggested anything new relating to the meaning of ‘defect’, so we 
can safely assume that the CPA is still our first port of call. 
 
 What we can surmise from the case law is a particular discomfort with unpacking what 
‘persons generally are entitled to expect’ and some inconsistency in the rulings. The early 
waves of product liability cases covered many of the issues which we now see as common 
sense. The infamous case of B v McDonalds,88 heard in 2002, confirmed that obvious risks do 
not make products defective. The claimants here attempted to persuade the courts that the cups 
used by McDonalds were defective for failing to contain the hot liquid when knocked over, to 
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no avail. It was held that the level of safety a consumer is entitled to expect accommodates for 
obvious risks which are well known by the public.89 Just a few years prior, Richardson v LRC 
Products held that consumers are not entitled to expect that products will never fail,90 and 
Abouzaid v Mothercare established that there would be a defect where there was not sufficient 
warning about a risk.91 These three cases mark the beginning of the CPA litigation and provided 
the first level of clarification so desperately needed.  
 
 The next wave of cases, by contrast, open our eyes to the complexity of the expectations 
test. It begins in 2001 with A v National Blood Authority,92 providing one of the most 
comprehensive discussions of the CPA to date. The question put to the court in this case was 
whether blood products containing Hepatitis C could be considered defective under the CPA. 
There were two significant discussions in this case; the first concerned the meaning of defect, 
and the second concerned the scientific defence (discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis). The first 
part of the judgment discussed whether the public was entitled to expect a risk of unclean blood 
in general, and further whether there was a known risk that the blood would be infected with 
Hepatitis C. It was held that no such expectations existed. The public were uninformed of the 
risk and thus were entitled to expect the blood would be free from infections.93 Burton J split 
products into ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ categories. He suggested that all non-standard 
products would be considered defective by their nature of being ‘non-standard’, however, 
because he was satisfied that the case concerned a non-standard product, he failed to provide 
any explanation of standard products as they relate to defects aside from their inherently more 
complex resolution.94 Burton J interpreted ‘all circumstances’ in s.3(2) of the CPA to mean 
only relevant circumstances95 and uses this interpretation to exclude a consideration of 
avoidability for being outwith the purpose of the directive.96 Both this interpretation and the 
discussion of standard/non-standard products have been criticised recently by Wilkes v DePuy 
International.97 On the matter of avoidability, while not disagreeing with Burton J’s approach 
to the matter, it noted that whether or not a risk was avoidable would factor into the public’s 
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assessment of safety, making it relevant to the test established by the directive.98 The court was 
much more overtly critical of the categorisation of standard/non-standard products, calling it 
“unnecessary and undesirable.”99 It was considered to be too rigid and distracting from the 
charge to the courts to consider the appropriate level of safety.100 A v National Blood Authority 
and Wilkes discussed the ‘acceptability’ of risks in the eyes of the public in relation to 
determining the appropriate level of safety, transforming an apparently objective test in the 
CPA into one that seems relatively subjective. While discussions of ‘acceptable risks’ are 
necessary, a lack of consistent approach to determining what consumers are entitled to expect 
may create issues. 
 
 Another set of queries raised originates again in 2001 with Foster v Biosil.101 Here it 
was stated that the CPA requires the claimant to prove both the fact of the defect and the cause 
of the defect.102 This reasoning was supported later in Piper v JRI because to hold otherwise 
would allow every part of the product to be in contention.103 However, more recently, a certain 
line of cases have diverged from this opinion. In Ide v ATB Sales, the judge was satisfied with 
proof of the existence of a potential defect.104 This does not differ greatly from Foster, since 
there is still a requirement to prove that some defect was present, however the level of proof 
appeared to be less in Ide than in previous cases. The primary departure from this reasoning 
stems from the CJEU’s decision in Boston Scientific,  when it was established that one defective 
product in a product group can lead to any product in that group as being classified as 
defective.105 This ruling means that there may be times where a risk of defect will be sufficient 
to fulfil the definition despite the specific product lacking proof that it contains the defect in 
question. Boston Scientific is not alone in this outlook; it is only one in a number of EU cases 
which have found defects without a precise cause.106  
 
This snapshot of the case law reveals two primary issues with the test for defectiveness: 
1) the requisite level of proof; and 2) how we adequately assess what consumers are entitled to 
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expect and the role of risk in consumer expectations. The following sections will explore each 
of these issues and their relevance to the AV debate.  
 
 
3.2: The burden of proof 
 
 The first issue I will explore is the level of proof necessary in a product liability case. 
We have already seen that the case law has not been clear as to what amount of proof is 
sufficient to relieve the burden. As noted above, Foster v Biosil suggests that there must be 
proof of an actual defect, not merely that the product is unsafe. The case law shows two 
elements which require proof: the existence of the defect and its relation to the damage. Proving 
the existence of the defect is fundamental to the claim, otherwise the CPA cannot take effect. 
It was further reasoned in Piper v JRI that this is also necessary to avoid the trial becoming 
“unfocussed and of disproportionate length and expense.”107 Mildred is concerned at the 
apparent lack of clarity seen in the case law when it comes to the issue of proof of 
defectiveness.108 One can sympathise with this perspective as the case law is intended to 
explain the law rather than add complications. Both Foster and Piper v JRI adopted a 
particularly hard-line approach to the matter of proof, and both resulted in claimants being 
unable to satisfy that burden.  Similarly, Richardson resulted in a failed claim because the 
claimant was unable to prove that there was an existing defect over merely a level of 
unsafety.109  
 
On the other hand, cases such as Tesco v Pollard110 and Palmer v Palmer111 seem to be 
inconsistent with previous decisions on the level of proof. Although in Tesco there was no 
defect found to exist, the tests used by the court to determine whether this was the case appear 
to be internally inconsistent. Here a bottle cap failed to meet required manufacturing 
regulations and yet was not found to be defective because the bottle was “more difficult to open 
than if it had an ordinary screwtop.”112 This is a much more lenient interpretation of ‘defect’ 
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compared to other cases, however it also imposes an extremely high burden to satisfy since 
proving the failure to meet safety regulations was not sufficient to find a defect in this case. 
The judge suggested this was simply because the public would not know about the regulations 
so could not expect that those regulations would be met.113 Palmer took a different approach 
and found a defect to have existed where it was possible that the damage may have been partly 
caused by consumer actions and not exclusively the product itself.114 There were questions 
about potentially misleading instructions accompanying the seatbelt in Palmer which will have 
played a role in the outcome. What Palmer demonstrates is that there are often factors which 
contribute to the existence of a defect without necessarily needing to prove with absolute 
certainty a causal relationship. It shows an appreciation for the complex nature of product 
liability, an attitude which is lacking in Foster and Piper.  
 
Accommodating this inherent complexity will become incrementally more important 
the more pervasive technology becomes. If the courts continue the strict approach seen in 
Foster and Piper, it will be almost impossible to bring a successful claim for an AV under the 
CPA. AVs involve an infusion of traditional automobile technology with several new pieces to 
provide automation, all of which have their own potential for defects. Requiring strict evidence 
of the existence of the defect, the cause of that defect, and the link between the defect and the 
damage may prove too difficult for such an intricate piece of machinery. Indeed, Cohen has 
raised this difficulty in relation to satisfying the risk-utility test required in America, noting 
that providing hard evidence may create “an incredibly high burden of proof, make it difficult 
to find qualified experts with legitimate experience, and simply make it too expensive to pursue 
claims.”115 Although the UK has not adopted a risk-utility approach to product liability116 these 
concerns are just as applicable to the CPA: regardless of the expected level of safety, proof that 
this level of safety was not met is required, and the more complicated the product, the more 
difficult this becomes.  
 
Notwithstanding, it appears there may be hope for easing the burden in future product 
liability claims. A string of more recent cases suggests that the level of proof required is no 
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longer as stringent as before. Two cases, Ide v ATB Sales and Lexus v Russell, heard together, 
suggest that proof of the cause of the defect is not required by the CPA. In Ide, specific proof 
of the cause of the defect was not necessary for the judge to find the product defective,117 and 
in Lexus it was sufficient to establish probable cause for the defect.118 Neither of these cases 
required hard evidence of the exact nature of the defect but took a more general approach to 
the problem. McGlinchey v General Motors followed Ide’s approach, holding that “a pursuer 
may not have to prove the precise mechanism of how the defect led to the failure,”119 again 
supporting a more lenient approach to proof. This was reinforced in Hufford v Samsung 
Electronics, where it was stated that despite this less burdensome approach, the claimant is still 
required to prove the existence of a defect, “albeit unspecified.”120 These cases mark a 
definitive change in the court’s attitude to the level of proof required. They do not diminish 
entirely the need for evidence, but rather reframe it in the appropriate context. There is a clear 
acknowledgment that these cases involve many parts and often locating the exact defect will 
be difficult.  
 
Howells has been highly critical of the harshness of previous judgments where the 
product clearly did not exhibit a sufficient level of safety but did not succeed because the exact 
location could not be found.121 He suggests instead valuing the expected level of safety over 
exact proof in cases where there was not common knowledge or specific warning of a risk.122 
The courts seem to be tending towards this balance, although have not abandoned the need for 
evidence altogether. What Howells’ discussion and the case law represent, however, is a shift 
in importance, favouring consumer expectations over specific evidence. Permitting general 
proof of a defect is a clear statement that claimants will not be prevented from succeeding in a 
claim purely because of the technological complexities involved. We can expect that this 
reasoning will be upheld in any future cases involving AVs; claimants will not be required to 
highlight exactly what part of the software malfunctioned or why, but simply that the software 
failed in some capacity, providing evidence that the AV was defective.  
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Further to this change in direction is the case of Boston Scientific. It pushes the 
boundaries on requiring proof, and it remains unclear to what extent it will be upheld in the 
UK.  The question before the court was whether a product, in this case a pacemaker and an 
implanted cardioverter defibrillator, could be considered defective because it belongs to a 
group of products that had an increased risk of failure despite no evidence of a defect in the 
specific product in question. It considered whether the increased risk with these products 
resulted in a level of safety which was not satisfactorily high enough. The court held that this 
was accurate. It stated: 
 
“where it is found that such products belonging to the same group or forming 
part of the same production series have a potential defect, it is possible to 
classify as defective all the products in that group or series, without there being 
any need to show that the product in question is defective.”123 
 
It considered that the increased risk was enough such that proof of the individual defect was 
not necessary to establish that the product did not meet the entitled level of safety. Jervis 
celebrates Boston for strengthening the idea that the precise nature of the defect does not need 
to be proven.124 Indeed, its reasoning is especially relevant to AVs where mass-produced 
vehicles could all potentially be affected by the same defect. An awareness of failure in one 
vehicle could be sufficient evidence to hold all vehicles in that same product group defective. 
If the courts choose, however, to reject or limit the scope of Boston and focus on the earlier 
cases of Foster and Piper, the challenge for proving the existence of a defect in an AV will 
increase substantially and, arguably, disproportionately.  
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3.3: Assessing expectations 
 
 I now turn to the question of consumer expectations. The CPA turns on the level of 
safety of a product and states that in assessing what persons are entitled to expect, all the 
circumstances will be taken into account,125 which Burton J in A v National Blood Authority 
has taken to mean relevant circumstances.126 The expected level of safety has been difficult to 
ascertain because it was intended to be a flexible test. The downside to this flexibility is 
uncertainty in knowing what factors impact expectations and to what extent. It has been made 
clear that consumers cannot expect perfection127 however consistency beyond this is lacking. 
One of the difficulties the courts have faced is finding the balance between actual expectations 
and entitled expectations. A v National Blood Authority discussed this challenge, noting that 
the public may not have any expectations, or that their actual expectations could be higher or 
lower than what they are entitled to expect.128  
 
 Just as consumers are not entitled to expect perfection, they are entitled to expect at 
least a basic level of safety. In McGlinchey v General Motors, it was held that consumers can 
expect handbrakes to perform their function and not suddenly fail without warning.129 Applied 
generally, there can be an entitled expectation that products will work according to their 
specifications. Clearly, the boundary of expectation lies somewhere between minimal 
performance and perfection. While the majority of cases focusing on expectation provide some 
clarification in accordance with these guidelines, Tesco arrived at a decision that has slightly 
troubled some academics.130 It chose to give weight to the idea that “members of the public … 
are unlikely to have the faintest idea to what safety standard the product they are buying has 
been designed, if it has been designed to any” 131 and therefore it could not be concluded that 
the public were entitled to expect the products to meet the specifications in the regulations. 
This decision sits uncomfortably because it appears to base its decision on what the actual 
expectation of the public is, instead of asking what the expectation should be. By not holding 
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that the public is entitled to expect that products will comply with regulations – what seems to 
be a common-sense position – Tesco is acknowledging a degree of specificity in consumer 
expectations not seen elsewhere. Fairgrieve and Howells note some of the critique of Tesco 
derives from the courts failure to explain its emphasis on the actual expectations.132 Indeed, an 
explanation of this fact from the court would provide insight as to why the failure to comply 
with regulation was not material to the determination of expectations. Instead, we are left to 
wonder how a similar failure will be treated in the future.  
 
Tesco leaves us with two seemingly conflicting understandings of expectations to 
reconcile. One tells us that we must only look to what persons are entitled to expect, and the 
other tells us we may consider society’s actual expectations. What is apparent, however, is that 
the courts have found an assessment of the acceptability of risk to be persuasive in their 
determination of entitled expectations, suggesting that persons cannot expect a freedom from 
risks which are accepted by the public. B v McDonalds is a perfect example; here it was a 
known and accepted risk that hot coffee, when spilled, may cause scalding. However, because 
this risk was accepted by the public there was no entitlement to safety.133 The courts have 
viewed risks which are made known as acceptable, so with adequate warnings manufacturers 
will not be liable for product failures associated with these risks.134 However, there are a 
significant number of risks which accompany products which are publicly known, and yet will 
also result in finding a product to be defective. Consider the case of Boston Scientific. It was 
stated that the public cannot expect medical devices to be effective 100% of the time135 and the 
patients were warned that there was a risk that their devices could fail without warning. 
Nevertheless, the claimant’s pacemaker was considered defective because of an added risk of 
failure.136 
 
It has been established on several occasions that there is no guarantee that products will, 
or can, be 100% safe137 therefore an understanding of acceptable risks is indispensable for a 
proper assessment of entitled expectations. In A v National Blood Authority, Burton J went to 
great lengths to emphasise the difference between the USA’s and the UK’s approach to 
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acceptable levels of safety, stating that the UK would not adopt a risk-utility approach but 
would instead remain centred on legitimate expectations. While this statement removes the 
ability to rely on any perceived benefit a product will provide to society to justify the risks, it 
does not eradicate the need to evaluate the risks themselves. There will always be risks 
associated with products but there is a universal awareness that certain risks will not be 
tolerable and will lead to defective products. So where do we draw the line for determining 
acceptability? Understanding this question is complex and is the subject of many books.138 The 
literature suggests two diverging theories about risks in relation to product liability. The first 
pertains to risks which were accompanied by a warning, and the second to risks which were 
‘known and accepted’.139 It is worth unpacking in brief to provide the context in which the risks 
of AVs must be understood. 
 
It is widely accepted that risks which are warned against do not generally give rise to 
liability. This was the subject of two significant cases in 2000, Abouzaid v Mothercare,140 and 
Worsley v Tambrands.141 Abouzaid involved a faulty strap on a pushchair. There was no direct 
warning that using it in particular ways would likely result in a failure, so it was found to be 
defective for failing to provide such warnings.142 Worsley involved a woman who suffered from 
Toxic Shock Syndrome (TSS) and claimed that there was not sufficient warning for this risk. 
The court in this case, however, found that there indeed had been clear warnings. There was an 
initial warning on the box with more substantial detail contained in a leaflet inside the box, 
which was considered enough to meet the requirements to warn of a risk.143 More recently, this 
approach was upheld in Buckley v Henkel,144 where it was submitted to the court that despite 
following instructions contained in a hair dye product, use led to an allergic reaction, rendering 
the product defective. The court did not accept this submission however, because like in 
previous cases, risk of a potential reaction was covered in the warnings which specifically 
stated that following the instructions and completing the patch test would not guarantee 
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freedom from any adverse reaction.145 Likewise, in A v National Blood Authority no such 
warning for potential blood defects existed, favouring the claimant’s case.146 We can surmise 
from these cases that where a warning is present the manufacturer will not be liable for any 
injury resulting from the warned risk. This provides an incredibly helpful foundation for 
warned risks, especially for AVs where the courts have not yet faced a decision directly on the 
matter.  
 
What these cases do not capture, however, is any potential limit on the manufacturer’s 
ability to avoid liability. It is clear that some risks will result in defects, irrespective of warnings 
(consider Boston Scientific, for example). Here, we turn to risks which are ‘known and 
accepted’. B v McDonalds demonstrated that there are certain risks which are deemed so 
obvious to the public in general that liability will not ensue should the risk manifest. To frame 
this in the context of the CPA, the public is not entitled to expect freedom from risks which 
were known and accepted. This naturally leads to asking which risks were in fact known and 
accepted under the circumstances. This question has been handled somewhat inconsistently. 
Buckley v Henkel accounted for the belief that individuals who used hair dyes would have a 
greater awareness of the risks involved in the process,147 whereas Wilkes supports an approach 
which considers the public at large, not merely the targeted users of the product.148 The 
favoured approach for AVs may well affect the outcome of cases, as the knowledge of those 
who use AVs may not be representative of the general public. It will be important for the courts 
to clarify their approach moving forward to ensure future consistency in the application of this 
rule.  
 
The focus on risk in the case law has concerned Eisler for one.149 He believes that risk 
requires a test of unreasonableness on behalf of the consumer rather than evaluating whether 
or not the manufacturer has failed his duty to provide a product of satisfactory safety, a 
direction which he feels “deviates from the ostensible intention of the CPA.”150 While he is 
justified in questioning how far the courts have pushed the test towards a determination of 
unreasonableness, the courts have never amalgamated a negligence assessment into a claim 
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under the CPA. Naturally, a question of unreasonableness must be asked of the consumer in 
the interests of justice as there may be factors deriving from the consumer’s actions which 
would hinder the causation requirement. However, none of this undermines the strict liability 
flowing from the CPA, nor does it eliminate the need to consider risk. Fundamental to the test 
established by the CPA is determining the minimum level of safety the public is entitled to 
expect, and the perception of risk plays an important role in this determination.  
 
Many studies have investigated the relation between behaviour and perceived risk, and 
certain trends have evolved.151 Renn has observed that the perceived control an individual has 
over the outcome is related to the perception of that risk.152 He discusses the different 
perceptions of risk involved in driving compared to flying, noting that individuals often feel 
that there is a possibility of evading the accident in a car, but no possibility of such escape in a 
plane.153 This trend has also been seen with seatbelt usage, where despite overwhelming 
evidence that seatbelts reduce the chance of injury the majority of the public continue to refuse 
to use them.154 Indeed, the same pattern emerges when comparing standard vehicles to AVs. 
The Financial Times notes a survey from 2016 in which the majority of UK drivers believe 
driverless cars are unsafe, with the most common concern being that the AV will not be able 
to avoid an accident.155 Remarkably, this phenomenon was captured in the article with a quote 
from Charlie Henderson, a partner at PA Consulting Group, commenting that “driving the car 
ourselves may not be as safe as having a machine doing it, but at least when we drive we feel 
safe because we have control over it.”156 Indeed, a study produced by Virginia Tech shows that 
AVs have marginally lower accident rates than vehicles with human drivers when unreported 
crashes are factored.157 
 
These discrepancies in the perception of risk leave the courts with a dilemma: how do 
we properly account for the risks involved in using certain products with a test which relies on 
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the public’s expectations where those expectations may be entirely askew from reality? On one 
hand, the actual perception of risk is of little relevance given the formulation of the test; on the 
other hand, we are only entitled to an expectation which can be justified, and that justification 
will be found in an assessment of the risk as it pertains to the activity. Thus, we find a general 
expectation by evaluating the legitimacy of the actual expectations. Howells, writing on 
nanotechnology, devises categories of risk to help understand which risks ought to result in a 
defect and which risks can be deemed ‘known and accepted’. He highlights three categories:158 
− Totally unexpected risks (TUR) 
− Potential but still unexpected risks (PUR) 
− Suspected identified defects (SID) 
TUR are things which were not anticipated, and although unlikely, are still a possibility with 
emerging technologies, such as AVs. Howells suggests that under a consumer expectations 
test, TUR will always render a product defective.159 There is, of course, a question of 
discoverability (see chapter 5 for a further discussion on discoverability, however note that this 
element is not relevant to determining the entitled level of safety). PUR is trickier to classify. 
These are things which are acknowledged as potential hazards but are not yet seriously 
considered or known. Again, there is a question of discoverability, more so for PUR than for 
TUR, however it is still of no relevance to the consumer expectations test in question here. 
PUR will turn on whether the public was adequately informed of the risk so as to be deemed 
to have accepted it.160 The last category, SID, are risks which are supported by evidence and 
therefore identifiable as potential defects, however it is less likely that manufacturers can 
escape liability due to their state of knowledge. If the risks are widely known, it is also less 
likely that they will be considered defects because of the public’s potential acceptance of such 
risks.  
 
As we move from TUR to SID, the acceptability of such risks will increase. We cannot 
accept risks which are completely unknown or unpredictable, therefore we cannot consider it 
part of a standard product for those risks to materialise. Yet with risks which are known and 
supported by evidence, we find it hard to justify that they will lead to a defect because the 
public is warned and often informed about avoiding the risk. These categories help visualise 
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the importance of acceptability in justifying a certain level of safety. This will be pivotal in 
future cases involving AVs, since the tests – and resulting failures – of the vehicles have been 
made more public than many other product testings. The courts will need to be wary of the 
potential mismatching perception of risk relating to AVs in their assessment of legitimate 
expectations, especially since the majority of the risks (that we currently know of) are known 
to the public. 
 
 Despite the progress the courts have made in clarifying the operation of the test in the 
CPA, some academics are wary of using the courts at all to determine product liability cases. 
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein feel that the legal system is not designed to make technical 
considerations in product liability cases. They are wary of expert witnesses being tugged one 
way or another rather than neutrally presenting the information and are concerned by the 
complexity of the considerations the courts are required to make.161 Stapleton, while not 
critiquing the legal system, shares the concern that product liability is complex and the test 
inadequate. She believes that ‘expectations’ are not sufficient to determine whether or not there 
is a defect because it does not account for the complexity of products. ‘Expectations’, in her 
view, focus on what is obvious (e.g. Donoghue v Stevenson and the snail in the ginger 
beer162).163 Indeed, these concerns can be felt with regard to AVs. These products are incredibly 
complex, and the public’s expectations cannot hope to appreciate the intricacy of the 
manufacturing process. The expectations for these vehicles will be over-simplified and 
possibly unaware of the technical limitations. Additionally, those best placed to understand 
where the product has failed and why are not the courts, but the producers themselves. Sifting 
through the technical arguments supplied to the court by the producers and comparing these to 
the general expectations held by the public is a formidable task, and one which may be better 
suited to a committee of experts or tribunal as opposed to the general court. It is worth 
considering the effectiveness of the current methods of pursuing claims as we move closer to 
AVs. Litigation for these accidents will be long and technical, and it is possible that the interests 
of swift justice call for establishing an alternative method of deciding claims.  
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Regardless of our opinion about alternative methods to address these claims, it is clear 
that assessing the public’s expectations is a complicated element of the test for defectiveness. 
The public may not fully understand the product in question, and thus will have an expectation 
of safety which is either too generous or not strict enough. The perception of risk will affect 
this expectation, and will result in discrepancies when evaluating public expectations. This is 
evident with emerging technologies, particularly AVs where the general public has no 
understanding yet of how the cars are supposed to function, or indeed what they are capable 
of. The gap between those who celebrate and those who are cautious of the technology is large 
and it will be difficult to conclude a general expectation of safety from such a wide variety of 
perspectives. The courts need to acknowledge these factors to make an informed decision based 
on these expectations and its significance must not be undermined to ensure that an accurate 
picture of the expected level of safety is provided. 
 
 
3.4: Two conundrums 
 
Once the issue of determining the expected level of safety has been overcome, we are still 
faced with the unique issues presented by the complexity of AVs. There are two further 
questions to address in relation to our understanding of ‘defect’. First, there are general 
concerns arising from Boston Scientific as it relates to products which do not have a defect per 
se, but merely an increased risk of a defect. It is possible this same concern will be felt in 
relation to AVs. We must explore the reasoning in Boston Scientific to understand the impact 
it will have on any future cases brought against a producer of an AV. Second, given the goal 
for AVs to substitute for driver responsibility and decision making, it is inevitable that AVs 
will face ethical dilemmas. Although it is not the goal of this thesis to explore the nature of 
moral issues or the best method by which to resolve them, I wish to raise the question in the 
context of AVs to show that this hurdle is much more pressing than some of the individuals 
leading the AV debate believe. 
 
 As noted previously, Boston Scientific found a defect to exist where there was an 
increased risk of a product failure. This direction is more liberal than some of the prior cases 
heard in the UK, and it is hoped by many to be the direction in which product liability will now 
move. Fairgrieve and Pilgerstorfer describe this test as “simply the tendency or propensity of 
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the product to result in identified harm.”164 Nevertheless, there are some who feel that Boston 
Scientific goes too far. Bergkamp feels that moving from ‘defect’ to ‘potential defect’ is too far 
outwith the scope of the CPA and goes beyond what was originally intended.165 This appears 
to be a misunderstanding of the original test in the CPA, which does not make a distinction 
between a ‘defect’ and a ‘potential defect’ as Bergkamp has. The words in the CPA state that 
“there is a defect in a product … if the safety of the product is not such as persons generally 
are entitled to expect.”166 It is perfectly feasible to include an increased risk in this definition if 
the increased risk amounts to a level of safety lower than what is expected by the public. We 
must be cautious to differentiate between standard risks which are ‘known and accepted’ and 
those which are an added risk beyond an expected level of safety. This distinction will be 
pivotal moving forward with AVs. There will never be complete freedom from accidents, so it 
will be necessary to acknowledge in advance what the general level of safety to be expected 
from these vehicles will be so that we can adequately determine what the threshold for ‘added 
risk’ is.  
 
The final question to ask in this section relates to the ethical issues AVs will face. Drivers 
are sometimes presented with tough choices leading to accidents, but often do not have the 
reaction times or all the information to make an informed decision about what course of action 
to follow. For example, if a car is accelerating towards the driver in question, does he stay the 
course and collide head on with the car or swerve into the oncoming traffic? Typically, gut 
reactions will prioritise our own safety and the response is usually to swerve in an attempt to 
avoid the accident, but this will often result in far more injuries and considerable damage to 
other vehicles in addition to the two vehicles involved in the collision. This scenario is known 
in philosophy as the ‘trolley problem’. While widely discussed, Jeffcott and Inglis raise it in 
the context of driverless cars so it is to their work that I will refer.167 The trolley problem is as 
follows: 
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A train is travelling along a track and up ahead are five individuals stuck on 
the tracks. There is the ability to divert the train thus saving the five 
individuals, however this alternative route contains one individual stuck on 
the track. Do you allow the train to continue on its course and kill five people, 
or do you divert the train to save those five people, killing one individual in 
the process? 
 
The problem will not always be that obvious in the context of driverless vehicles, however. 
There are many other circumstances to consider and the balance between the choices will 
manifest in different ways. It could be to engage in a head on collision to potentially save ten 
lives, veer into an elderly person to save a mother and her child, or to run off the road and kill 
the passenger to avoid the collision altogether. These are hard choices to comprehend, and yet 
a choice will need to be made. An AV will have the ability to process all the surrounding 
circumstances to know exactly what its options are, a feat not necessarily possessed by humans 
in the same scenario. However, there is no easy solution or one method to capture all the 
potential scenarios an AV might face.  
 
I raise the issue of the trolley problem not to discuss its validity, nor to suggest a course 
of action which I deem most appropriate. I raise the issue to highlight an additional dilemma 
posed when these choices have the potential to become automated. There is a concern that if 
an AV makes such a choice it will not be clear whether this is purely an ethical conundrum or 
a potential defect. While presently this point may be moot due to the fact that we do not have 
the ability to program vehicles in this way, it is an issue to consider before investigations are 
made into making this possible. Certainly, if it becomes technologically possible to allow AVs 
the ability to make this choice by weighing the circumstances, there is immediately a lack of 
certainty in outcome. The number of variables present in these problems will mean the decision 
may never be made the same way twice, and arguably, results in a product which does not meet 
the ‘expected level of safety’. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that each model of AV will 
be programmed the same because there is no uniformity in production or research. Jeffcott and 
Inglis discuss the variations in approach to the problem, noting that presently the lack of 
guidance from the Government on this issue means that manufacturers are free to resolve the 
dilemma however they deem best.168 This liberty will inevitably lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ 
                                            
168 Ibid p.23 
 
46 
 
for ethical decision-making as manufacturers seek out whatever programming is most 
‘consumable’ by the market. It would surely be most beneficial to society to decide on a 
consistent approach to the ethical elements of AVs to avoid any potential conflicts of interest 
or a ‘race to the bottom’.  
 
 
3.5: Conclusion 
 
 While the CPA was enacted to include flexibility to allow for an accurate consideration 
of the context of defects, many things remain uncertain 30 years on. This chapter has sought to 
analyse some points of concern raised by the test for defectiveness in the CPA in order to 
present an accurate picture of what areas require improvement moving forwards with the 
implementation of AVs. The level of proof required presently is unsettled and while there are 
hopes that the courts have moved towards a more forgiving test which focuses less on proving 
the existence of the causal link between defect and damage and providing hard evidence of an 
actual defect, lingering cases leave us wondering what direction future cases will go in.  
 
Even if we are able to meet the burden of proof and demonstrate that an AV has a defect, 
how do we determine whether it was accepted by society? There are inconsistencies in 
approaching the determination of the expected level of safety and it is unclear, especially with 
regards to AVs, what knowledge the public is deemed to have and what the public has been 
sufficiently informed about to satisfy this test. Further to this question is the uncertain role of 
risk in determining the level of safety. Given that perceptions of risk are not always accurate, 
clarity is required for understanding whether this is relevant to determining the level of safety 
and how the courts ought to approach such an issue, particularly where there will be 
misconceptions about AV ability and behaviour.  
 
Next, we face the issue of whether we can determine an AV to be defective if another 
AV by the same producer is determined to be defective. Following Boston Scientific, it appears 
that this will be the case, however this view has not yet been tested by the UK courts and so 
will remain an area of uncertainty until such clarification is provided. Finally, we are 
confronted with the question of how AVs will make ethical decisions, and whether these 
decisions are easily differentiable from defects in the programming. Enforcing a uniform 
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approach to the ethical questions may help reduce uncertainty in some cases, but the number 
of variables faced by AVs in making these determinations will always result in a variety of 
outcomes which some members of the public may feel leads to a level of safety which is below 
what is expected, thus rendering the vehicles defective. Much of the CPA and subsequent case 
law is applicable to AVs, and for the majority of cases they will adequately cover any potential 
problems to arise. Despite this, there are weak points in the law – an indeterminate burden of 
proof, the role of risk in assessing expectations, how to handle ‘potential defects’, and ethical 
concerns related to AV decision making – which, if addressed, will provide much needed 
comfort to manufacturers and consumers alike as their rights under the law will become more 
concrete. 
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Chapter 4: The Property Classifications 
 
 Although some work may be needed to alter the definition of defect, until any changes 
are made claims may still be necessary under the law as it presently stands. This chapter seeks 
to examine how the law currently handles claims for damage. The scenario is quite simple: an 
AV, through a software or manufacturing defect, is caused to crash. From this general picture 
there are several more specific scenarios which each require contemplation: First, I am the 
owner of the AV, and my accident causes no harm or external damage, but I have damaged by 
vehicle; second, I am still the owner of the AV, however my accident has damaged my private 
property; third, I am not the owner of the AV, but my personal property has been damaged by 
the accident; and fourth, I am not the owner of the AV, but my business property has been 
damaged by the accident. Note that I have excluded physical harm from the above scenarios. 
While I will mention the provisions which presently address physical harm in passing, it has 
been excluded intentionally due to the relative ease with which claims can be made and 
addressed under this branch of damage. The focus will remain on damage to property. These 
scenarios each represent a different category of claim and will be used to illustrate the 
potentially contentious, or at a minimum, unclear, issues in the CPA and the AEVA.  
 
The AV technological revolution raises another two general questions in product 
liability in addition to the above scenarios that I seek to address. The first is the scope of 
proximity. Given that the product in question is now a vehicle operating freely on the roads, 
the number of potential parties to suffer loss from a defective product greatly increases, and a 
comment must be made on that fact. The second is the understanding of ‘private use’ in the 
CPA. The CPA excludes liability for damage to property that is not intended ordinarily for 
private use or consumption.169 A better understanding of the meaning of this phrase is required 
in the context of road vehicles.  
 
This chapter will begin with these general questions. It first seeks to understand the 
rationale for the inclusion and exclusion of certain types of damage under the CPA and will 
then assess the AEVA to determine whether these exclusions are still expedient. It will then 
consider the general concerns in claiming for damage to property raised by the introduction of 
AVs – the scope of proximity and the meaning of private use – and it will discuss whether the 
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present law and proposed legislation provide satisfactory answers to these queries. Finally, it 
will return to the four scenarios from the beginning to determine whether the law provides 
adequate routes to claiming damages, and where the gaps may lie.  
 
 
4.1: Two property categories 
 
 Before assessing the division in the current law, it is important to understand the 
rationale for having a distinction between commercial and private property. Whereas prior to 
the CPA all product liability claims were treated under negligence and therefore subsumed into 
one category, the CPA specifically excludes property not “ordinarily intended for private 
use.”170 This scope of damage necessarily excludes any form of commercial property from 
giving rise to liability under the act. The Law Commission Report expressed the economic 
justification for this exclusion in their report, noting that “commercial premises and property 
is usually covered by the owner’s taking out first party insurance.”171 In their view, a business 
is in a better position to know what property ought to be insured against possible damage and 
take steps to mitigate that damage in advance, but it is significantly less likely an ordinary 
consumer would do the same, and even less likely that personal injury would be insured against. 
They were also of the view that a business can distribute the cost of insurance amongst 
consumers through the price of its products, but because consumers cannot do the same this 
would constitute an unreasonable burden.172  
 
 This distinction for a long time has made sense, however the way in which certain 
commercial enterprises operate now brings a challenge to this division. Uber and Lyft are prime 
examples of enterprises which may face difficulties with the classification. These businesses 
operate similarly to traditional taxi companies, however the vehicles are personally owned by 
the driver. Under the banner of negligence this makes little difference since it is the driver who 
is responsible for the passenger’s safety. If this commercial model is maintained through the 
incorporation of AVs, any accidents will then be subject to product liability, and it is here that 
our concerns begin. If the vehicles are still personally owned by individuals, and therefore 
private property, and yet are on occasion used under a taxi scheme for profit, are the vehicles 
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still private property, or are they reclassified because of their commercial purposes? It may not 
be just to maintain this difference, at least by the economic rationale in the Law Commission 
Report. It has quickly become clear that the present rules need to be reconsidered in light of 
the challenges brought by new technology. The AEVA states that where an accident is caused 
by an insured AV, and “an insured person or any other person” suffers damage, the insurer will 
be held liable.173 It defines damage as “death or personal injury” or any property damage other 
than to the AV itself.174 While this is much the same as the description found in the CPA, the 
phrase ‘property damage’ in the AEVA only excludes the vehicle itself, goods carried for 
purchase, or property under control of the driver.175 There is no specific exclusion for property 
not intended for private use. This may be taken to include commercial property, however the 
Act will not be replacing the current rules for product liability and so must be coherent with 
the CPA.176 This creates a discrepancy between the two pieces of legislation, and it remains 
unclear whether the Act intended to include or exclude commercial property. If there is doubt 
the AEVA will be taken to uphold the distinction in the CPA due to a lack of clarity, however 
it does create the potential to forge a new avenue should the differences become problematic. 
Because this discussion is fairly hypothetical, I will not tread too far into the justifications for 
the distinction, nor will I comment further on whether this distinction is outdated. Until we 
understand more about how AVs will be treated in this context and have a firmer grasp on the 
reality in front of us it is difficult to provide an accurate and complete discussion. It is enough 
for now to understand why the distinction was enforced and what may create issues as AVs 
progress. With this in mind we will move on to slightly more tangible concerns.   
 
 
4.2: General concerns 
 
Due to the limits of human foresight there are bound to be parts of the legal system that 
are challenged by the changes brought by technology. Neither the CPA nor the general rules 
of delict accounted for the development of AI, so naturally there are points which need to be 
reconsidered. There are two issues which I have previously highlighted that I will unpack: the 
                                            
173 (AEVA) s.2(1) 
174 Ibid s.2(3) 
175 Ibid  
176 The Pathway Report. para.1.3 
 
51 
 
scope of proximity and the meaning of ‘private use’. I hope to clarify the sources of concern 
within these issues to determine what steps are required to mitigate those concerns. 
 
 The first issue to consider is the scope of proximity. While the CPA operates under a 
strict liability regime and does not require proof of fault, not every claim will be caught by the 
legislation, particularly if property not intended for private use continues to be excluded. In 
these scenarios, the requirements of negligence must be met. We take these requirements from 
Donoghue v Stevenson,177 where it was established that a successful claim in negligence 
requires that there is a duty of care owed, that such duty has been breached through negligent 
behaviour, and that the resulting harm was reasonably foreseeable. Caparo Industries plc v 
Dickman178 further refined the test for negligence to state that there must be sufficient 
proximity between the parties, and that the liability resulting from the breach is fair, just and 
reasonable to impose. The understanding of proximity in the common law has been a highly 
contested point. Donoghue v Stevenson understood proximity to be “persons who are so closely 
and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation when I 
am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question”179 while Caparo 
gave a marginally wider ambit, suggesting that there “has to be a sufficiently definable class 
of person who is likely to be injured.”180 What is discernible from the case law is that proximity 
is intended to restrict the duty of care to a limited number of ascertainable people and not the 
general public.  
 
 All of this said, the issue is much less ambiguous when considering road users. The 
Pearson Commission noted that the duty of care owed by road users to other road users is “well 
settled and taken for granted.”181 The logic of this assumption can be explained by a discussion 
in Perett v Collins.182 Although an aviation case, the two areas are of a similar nature regarding 
responsibility. Proximity was described in this case as follows: 
 
“Where the plaintiff belongs to a class which either is or ought to be within 
the contemplation of the defendant and the defendant by reason of his 
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involvement in an activity which gives him a measure of control over and 
responsibility for a situation which, if dangerous, will be liable to injure the 
plaintiff, the defendant is liable if as a result of his unreasonable lack of care 
he causes a situation to exist which does in fact cause the plaintiff injury.”183 
 
It is in having ‘control over and responsibility for’ driving the vehicle which creates sufficient 
proximity between road users. While this may seem unnecessary to state, it has not previously 
been the case that we have encountered product liability for vehicles in the capacity we will 
see from AVs. The primary difficulty we will encounter in these claims is who it is that has 
‘control over and responsibility for’ the vehicle. The obvious candidate is the user of the 
vehicle, however if the AV has an accident while it is in its fully autonomous mode, the user 
has no responsibility and certainly no control over the vehicle’s actions. The main competitor 
in the debate over control is the manufacturer. Since he is responsible for the software which 
will ultimately drive the car he has the responsibility to ensure it behaves safely on the road. It 
would be fair then to assume that the manufacturer will satisfy the relationship of proximity 
because they now have the ‘control over and responsibility for’ the actions of the AV.  
 
There is a certain discomfort with the nature of this duty of care because it appears 
contradictory to our understanding of proximity. Traditionally the duty of care has always 
remained confined to a relatively small class of individuals, however the prominence of global 
business and motor vehicles makes this duty one which is effectively owed to the world at 
large. Thus, the ever-growing dominance of technology will require us to set aside the 
traditional understanding of proximity for one which operates on a global scale. This issue may 
also become more complex over time as attempts to create ‘thinking’ AI are underway.184 If an 
AV has the ability to ‘decide’ how to handle a particular scenario it raises barriers towards 
holding the manufacturer accountable for any resulting damage. However, the issue of ‘smart’ 
AI is one which is far too large to tackle in one chapter, let alone a few paragraphs, so nothing 
further on the matter will be said here. It seems clear that, at least for now, there will be no 
problems in holding the manufacturer to be in a sufficiently proximate relationship with any 
party who could potentially suffer a loss from an AV.  
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 The next, and considerably more significant, problem relates to the meaning of ‘private 
use’ in the CPA.  Because property not intended for private use is excluded from the CPA, and 
potentially also from the AEVA, it has the potential for severe consequences when pursuing 
damages. While in general the understanding of ‘private use’ is settled, there are unique 
circumstances presented by vehicles which will create a new set of challenges for this meaning. 
However, first it is prudent to explain the meaning and reach of ‘private use’ presently. There 
is not a considerable discussion on the meaning of private use. The primary discussion can be 
found in Renfrew Golf Club v Motocaddy ltd.185 Here, a golf cart caught fire overnight and the 
golf club attempted to claim under the CPA for a defective product, however the manufacturers 
argued that since the golf club was a commercial building, the claim would fall outwith the 
scope of the CPA. The club submitted that it was a private golf club with exclusive access to 
members and thus was a building intended for private use, however this argument was not 
accepted by the court. It was held that the golf club was used for commercial activity and was 
available to a significant number of members, leaving it hard to classify the building as one 
subject to private use.186 The commercial nature of the activity appeared to be material to the 
classification in Renfrew Golf Club, giving an indication as to the difference between private 
and non-private property.  
 
The case’s helpfulness only goes so far, however. It does not provide much guidance 
or advice for handling future dilemmas, especially those which may be more obscure than in 
the present case. It did not explain what it meant by commercial activity, or whether there is a 
threshold to meet for activities to be considered ‘commercial’. Is there a certain amount of 
commercial activity required before the product can be considered to have a commercial 
function? Renfrew Golf Club simply stated that there was a “material amount of economic or 
commercial activity”187 but without any discussion about general factors to consider when 
determining if this threshold is met. That there is so little discussion on the point at the moment 
is perhaps due to the relative simplicity of the concept. It is not often that it will be difficult to 
distinguish between whether property is used privately or commercially, and it is certainly not 
an issue that has been raised with the courts often. However, with the prominence of the shared 
economy and the potential for this to become a product liability concern with the introduction 
of AVs, this simplicity may come to an end.  
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 Turning to vehicles, a brief detour to tax law is useful for demonstrating a specific 
difficulty that may arise with AVs. In tax law, the situations in which a vehicle is considered 
to be for private use become incredibly circumstantial and narrowly defined. The Income Tax 
(Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (ITEPA) considers vehicles made available to employees 
for their own personal use to be within the definition of ‘private use’ as long as that use is not 
for the employee’s business travel.188 Because tax law requires a categorisation of a vehicle, a 
vehicle’s use can be determined in advance, however this certainty cannot be maintained in 
some circumstances. If we were to take this specificity and apply it to vehicles in general (i.e. 
for purposes other than tax) we would find that if the vehicle was in operation while on a family 
outing at the weekend, we would have a vehicle for ‘private use’, but if that same vehicle were 
used to travel to work, it would then become a commercial vehicle. This same boundary 
crossover is noticeable presently with Uber and other lift-sharing schemes and will become 
more difficult to deal with when the vehicles involved become products. The ITEPA, for 
example, suggests that vehicles made available to employees that are used for a car pool are 
not considered to be for ‘private use.’189 This insight may impact the way in which AVs are 
treated under schemes like Uber. Under the ITEPA rule, individual’s personal vehicles may 
not be used for commercial activity, therefore car-pooling with one’s own personal vehicle 
would cross that boundary. How would Uber drivers navigate a similar rule? If their AV is 
their personal product can it be used for commercial activity? I am certainly not recommending 
that we adopt the specificity of these tax definitions into product liability for AVs. The 
rigidness of the rules may become incredibly limiting, especially because of the frequency with 
which vehicles could dip in and out of private and non-private classifications. While we should 
aspire to maintain a flexible definition to accommodate these new scenarios, the tax law 
example gives an idea as to the potential void which could appear if steps are not taken to 
clarify the meaning of ‘private use’ in this context.  
 
 This distinction becomes more relevant for motor vehicles because there is not always 
one categorical use for one type of vehicle. We see a variety of cars being used for different 
purposes, and a lack of clear guidance on how to determine which classify as commercial 
property and which do not.190 The Pathway Report questioned whether the distinction between 
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commercial property and private property remained relevant in the context of AVs191 however 
this was not addressed in the response to the report, nor has there been any clear indication that 
this distinction would be eradicated by the proposed legislation. This deficiency becomes more 
apparent when a system like Uber is considered. Uber revolutionised the taxi industry by 
allowing individuals to transform their personal car into one for carrying passengers at their 
discretion. Immediately it becomes clear that the border between private and commercial use 
is blurred. While this does not create a problem for current accidents as they are not pursued 
under product liability, when AVs are introduced there become unnecessary distinctions 
between the treatments of vehicles. Consider, for example, the scenario where AV ‘X’ crashes 
into AV ‘Y’ while the passenger in AV ‘Y’ is headed to the shops. AV ‘Y’ is property intended 
for private use and so can quite easily fall under the CPA for damage because of a defective 
product. If, however, AV ‘Y’ was in fact a taxi of some description, it may no longer be 
considered property intended for ‘private use’ since it is now engaged in a commercial activity. 
Trickier still is if AV ‘Y’ is ordinarily a privately-owned vehicle, but because it is autonomous 
its owner has allowed it to collect a passenger who will be exchanging money for this service. 
If AV ‘Y’ here is engaged in an accident before it has reached the passenger, is it at this point 
engaged in a commercial activity, or is it still considered to be for private use? This makes the 
specificity of tax legislation look desirable because we could account for many fact-specific 
scenarios such as the ones just described. However, the uncertain nature of future events will 
leave us hanging if we resort to legislating for every scenario possible. Instead of this approach, 
it is more desirable to establish, at minimum, a coherent test to determine the point at which 
vehicles are no longer considered to be property intended for ‘private use’. It is likely that the 
test could turn on the meaning of ‘ordinarily’ as used in the CPA, eliminating complications 
arising from infrequent dips into different categories of property, however even this is not 
watertight and could create challenges. This discussion very well might be for naught if the 
AEVA intended to include commercial property in its scope, but the lack of clarity means that 
until such time as that clarity is provided, the gap will remain.  
 
 While this is by no means an exhaustive discussion of the potential problems raised by 
AVs, it highlights concerns which are ascertainable in advance. Where issues are known, the 
law ought to be proactive in ensuring gaps are removed. Jonathan Smithers, the president of 
the Law Society of England and Wales, has stated that we ought to “look at the future, to 
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anticipate tomorrow’s needs and contribute to the development of whatever legal measures are 
necessary.”192 There will undoubtedly be further concerns raised by AVs as the technology 
continues to evolve and become more prominent, providing further reason to assuage the 
hurdles we can currently anticipate.  
 
 
4.3: Four scenarios 
 
 To conclude this chapter, I want to return to the four scenarios outlined in the 
introduction. After assessing some general concerns that the new legislation is yet to fully 
address, it is prudent to consider these four specific incidents to see if these concerns are 
remedied in practice, and where the gaps still remain. The four scenarios best represent the 
different conditions which result in pursuing a product liability claim. While it remains unclear 
whether commercial property will be covered by the AEVA, these scenarios will operate under 
the assumption that it will not be included.  
 
Scenario 1: An owner of an AV suffers damage to his property. In using my AV, I have 
been involved in an accident and my property that is not my vehicle has been damaged in the 
process. If I am a consumer and my property intended for ‘private use’ suffers, the procedure 
is relatively straightforward. Because the property falls within the definition in s.5 of the CPA, 
I can pursue my claim through strict liability against the manufacturer. Further still, I am 
covered by the AEVA to recover from my insurer.193 Where this becomes problematic is if my 
property is not intended for private use. If the property in question relates to my business, then 
under the CPA my claim is excluded from strict liability and I must seek a remedy through 
other means. While it is a possibility that the property is insured because of its commercial 
nature, it may not be and I may be limited to a claim through negligence or contract.  
 
Scenario 2: An owner of an AV suffers damage to his vehicle. My AV has crashed but 
in the process has only damaged itself. This has explicitly been excluded from both the CPA194 
and the AEVA195 because of the availability of contractual remedies for this type of damage.  
                                            
192 ‘Legal System Must Keep Pace with Technology to be Fit for the Future, Says the Law Society’ The Law 
Society, 22 June 2016 (accessed 4 December 2017) 
193 AEVA s.2 
194 CPA s.5(2) 
195 AEVA s.2(3)(a) 
 
57 
 
 
Scenario 3: A third party suffers damage to his private property. If I am a third party 
whose personal property has been damaged because of a defective AV, the process for 
recovering damages is narrower because of the absence of any contractual relationship with the 
manufacturer. Notwithstanding, given that the CPA was implemented precisely because of this 
kind of difficulty, there is ample provision for pursuing a claim since this type of damage falls 
within the meaning of ‘private use’ in s.5 of the CPA. Additionally, the AEVA’s requirement 
that the insurer be held liable is also applicable to a third party who suffers property damage,196 
so third parties have access to swift compensation from the owner’s insurer without needing to 
wade through a lengthy litigation process. 
 
Scenario 4: A third party suffers damage to his commercial property. Much trickier is 
the scenario where a third party suffers damage to their property which is not intended for 
private use. Because the individual is a third party there are no contractual remedies at his 
disposal, and because the property in question relates to his business, he is not covered by the 
CPA or the AEVA. This is where the shared economy presents problems. If the commercial 
property in question is something traditional, such as a place of business or a transportation 
vehicle, these things will likely be covered by insurance. But what if the scenario was more 
specific? I send my AV to collect a passenger through a lift-sharing program, but on its way 
another individual’s AV malfunctions and collides with mine. At this point in time my AV is 
engaged in a commercial activity, and if it is held to be a vehicle not intended for ‘private use’ 
at that time, I, a private individual, am not covered by the CPA or AEVA. Because I am not a 
company and do not have business insurance to cover me in these scenarios since it is my own 
personal vehicle, I am left to a common law negligence claim. And yet, if one minor detail 
changed the whole scenario would be treated differently: if my AV was instead on its way to 
collect me, it would no longer be performing a commercial function and would very clearly be 
covered by the CPA and AEVA.  
 
This is an incredibly specific scenario and it is understandable that the law would not 
be equipped to cover it. However, the popularity of Uber and other similar companies means 
that this scenario may become more commonplace, particularly as the use of AVs becomes 
more common. However, continuing to exclude commercial property with no exceptions raises 
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questions as to what the law is choosing to value. We are choosing the private/commercial 
dichotomy over principles of consistency in the law that require us to treat ‘like cases alike’. Is 
the distinction in this scenario one that is so vast that it warrants different legal approaches? 
While the gaps aren’t large, what these scenarios demonstrate is a particular issue created by 
the shared economy, where private individuals use their private property to engage in 
commercial functions. These moments cross boundaries and the law does not understand how 
to process this. It may not be complicated, but until we have definitive sources, whether from 
legislation or case law, it is unclear in what direction the law will go.  
 
 
4.4: Conclusion 
 
 This chapter sought to cover general concerns raised by AVs when seeking a claim for 
damage. It first looked to concerns raised by the distinction made in the CPA between 
commercial and private property. While the distinction was upheld because it was felt that 
business owners would be in a better position to protect and compensate damage to commercial 
property, that reasoning may no longer apply. The AEVA neither explicitly confirms nor 
excludes this distinction, so we must assume for the present that it remains. We also considered 
the understanding of proximity as it relates to road users. Avoiding negligent behaviour is not 
intended to be a duty owed to the world at large, and yet driver responsibility appears to be 
such a duty. There are several potential parties that could be considered responsible for an AV 
– the driver, the manufacturer, or one day perhaps an intelligent AI – but the nature of the duty 
would still allow these parties to fulfil the proximity requirements to be held responsible for 
the AVs actions. The question then becomes: who is most appropriate to hold responsible?  
 
The commercial/private property divide creates issues with the understanding of private 
use. Until now there have been few issues understanding the difference between these 
categories, however the use of AVs for ride sharing schemes challenges the prior definitiveness 
of private and commercial. The nature of the shared economy means that vehicles are 
sometimes used for both the private use of the individual and as commercial vehicles as part 
of a business. The novelty of a product performing this function means a lack of guidance for 
navigating the overlapping categories, and it would be prudent to consider how such issues will 
be handled. We finished the chapter by returning to four scenarios outlined in the introduction 
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to highlight where there are gaps in the legislation in pursuit of a claim for damages. The main 
concerns lie with AVs which are privately owned by individuals but which are used for 
commercial functions. This overlap between the commercial and private categories has not 
been considered by the present legislation, and it is unclear how such a claim would be handled. 
The shared economy challenges the justifications originally given for the divide between 
private and commercial property, and it is time to reconsider the reasoning to ensure that 
individuals engaged in commercial activity are not unjustly burdened by a rule that was not 
enacted with them in mind.   
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Chapter 5: Innovation and The Scientific Defence 
 
 Section 4 of the CPA contains several defences available to manufacturers of products 
in an attempt to leave space for innovation. While the majority of the defences are relatively 
uneventful, what has become known as the scientific defence has sparked many debates and 
remains one of the more controversial issues in product liability at present. In brief, the defence 
allows manufacturers to avoid liability if the state of scientific knowledge at the time of 
production did not allow for the defect’s discovery.197 Two main branches of questions stem 
from this provision: those relating to ‘knowledge’ and those relating to ‘discovery’. Given the 
ambiguity of the provision there is significant debate over the interpretation and extent of these 
definitions. Furthermore, the conspicuous gap in litigation surrounding the scientific defence 
leaves us uncertain about its meaning in the past, and gives us little to work with moving 
forwards with AV. The interpretations of ‘knowledge’ and ‘discovery’ will be vital for AVs; a 
loose interpretation may leave manufacturers with little responsibility to be proactive in 
searching for the vehicle’s limitations, however a strict interpretation will leave no room for 
error in a highly experimental field.  
 
While many are in support of the defence, albeit to varying degrees of strictness, there 
are simultaneously calls for the defence’s removal. The European Directive did not make the 
scientific defence mandatory for Member States, but the UK chose to adopt the defence in full. 
With the ever-increasing technological complexities of modern day products, it is perhaps time 
to re-evaluate the defence’s inclusion. While there are many elements to this debate, relevant 
to this thesis are the ways in which AVs will contribute to the ongoing discussion. Therefore, 
this chapter seeks to discuss two points. First, it will look at the definitions of knowledge and 
discovery as they relate to the scientific defence and will analyse what may happen if a claim 
involving an AV fell to requiring the use of the defence. Second, it will consider the challenges 
faced by the scientific defence and will discuss whether these challenges are sufficiently 
insurmountable for there to be a justifiable argument for removing the defence.  
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5.1: What is the scientific defence? 
 
 Although the move towards strict liability for products was welcomed, it was thought 
that too strict a regime would stifle innovation. Hence, the Product Liability Directive created 
defences to be available to the producers in order to maintain a certain level of freedom and 
security. These defences are set out in Article 7 of the directive. Article 7(e) states that a 
producer will not be held liable if he can prove that “the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the 
existence of the defect to be discovered.” The defence was not mandatory for member states to 
incorporate although many chose to include it in their domestic legislation. However, the UK’s 
inclusion of the defence has not been simple. The UK chose not to use the wording provided 
in the directive, and even this small difference has created friction in the law. The CPA states 
that the defence is available if it can be proved that “the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the same description 
as the product in question might be expected to have discovered the defect (emphasis 
added).”198 While there is very little difference between the two iterations of the defence, the 
reference to expectations in the CPA has led some to believe that the defence includes too much 
scope for a finding of reasonableness and takes the CPA further away from the strict liability 
regime it claims to be. Indeed, this question was presented in Commission v UK,199 where the 
court was asked whether or not the UK had failed to properly implement the directive. It was 
suggested that because the UK included in their defence reference to other producers it not only 
made the test less objective but also lowered the burden of proof.200 The court ultimately held 
that the UK did not fail to implement the directive. It stated that there is no restriction on the 
knowledge to be taken into account and does not depend on the subjective knowledge of the 
producer so deemed the wording of the CPA to be sufficiently similar to the directive.201 
Despite this ruling the defence has remained controversial and it continues to be debated 
amongst legal scholars in the UK. The majority of the discussion focuses around the extent to 
which the defence should operate, seeking to properly understand its parameters.  
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 The first contested parameter is the understanding of ‘knowledge’. The hint of 
reasonableness in the CPA creates a slight instability in the strictness of knowledge in the 
defence. At what point does knowledge become sufficient such that the producer must take 
action on the basis of such knowledge? While the directive suggests that this standard is rigid, 
referencing the objective ‘state of scientific and technical knowledge’, Commission v UK 
suggests otherwise. The case used the example of a study published in a remote Chinese village 
to demonstrate the constraints on which information constitutes knowledge.202 More relatable 
than this, Newdick suggests information could be located in a “confidential, internal, 
memorandum from a company in an unrelated industry”203 and following the reasoning from 
Commission v UK it would be unreasonable to expect producers to be aware of such 
information as inaccessible as this. However, these instances of considerably inaccessible 
information will not be the most common hurdle faced in relation to this question. More 
common will be the boundary between what is common practice in the industry and what is 
considered too obscure to pose a risk. In Bolton v Stone it was held that the relevant standard 
for negligence is whether the risk of injury was so remote that a reasonable person may not 
have anticipated it.204 Although the CPA is supposed to have moved on from the negligence 
standard this sounds similar to the rationale for the defence given in Commission v UK. 
Stapleton feels strongly that the defence reintroduces a fault standard to product liability despite 
the reformers attempting to leave negligence behind.205 There are certainly elements of fault 
given that this is a defence and requires proof of actions or inactions, yet it cannot be said that 
it maintains the same subjective test as negligence. Nevertheless, it does seem that the need to 
connect the defect to the information can be traced to connecting the risk of injury with the 
negligent behaviour from Bolton v Stone.  
 
  An understanding of where the limit of knowledge may be can be aided with a 
consideration of healthcare law. Although a mostly unrelated field, there have been 
considerable discussions surrounding best practice in medicine that may offer insight here. In 
1955, Hunter v Hanley established that a doctor will have behaved negligently if there is a 
usual and normal practice that he has deviated from, and there was no suggestion in the wider 
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medical practice that a doctor acting with ordinary skill and care would have adopted the course 
of action that he has.206 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management expanded on this definition, 
explaining that “a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, 
merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view. At the same time, 
that does not mean that a medical man can obstinately and pig-headedly carry on with some 
old technique if it has been proved to be contrary to what is really substantially the whole of 
informed medical opinion.”207 Doctors must abide by a practice which is accepted by the 
medical community. It does not have to be the most common or widely accepted practice, but 
it must be reasonable to adopt. Much more recently, Bolitho v City and Hackney Health 
Authority stated that “if it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not capable of 
withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not 
reasonable or responsible.”208 Therefore, if a doctor adopts a course of action which is not 
generally known or accepted, and the path is illogical because the body of opinion suggests as 
much, then the doctor may be found negligent. What we can take from this is that if there are 
general industry standards which are known and accepted then this is what is taken to be 
reasonable and normal practice. If there are obscure tests and studies which are not widely 
known or respected, it may not be reasonable to expect producers to adapt their behaviour 
according to such knowledge. This restriction in medical practice is similar to the limits of 
accessibility in the CPA, and similar to what Howells refers to as “totally unexpected risks” 
and “potential but still unexpected risks.”209 It would appear that if a risk is not known to the 
producer in the sense that there has been no research about the potential hazard the risk poses, 
it is unlikely that he will be expected to know of the risk. Hence, we have a test for the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge that is objective, by considering the general knowledge of 
the industry rather than the producer, and yet retains elements of reasonableness to ensure 
sufficient innovation may take place.  
 
 The second element to the scientific defence is the ability to discover the defect. This 
element connects the information with the potential harm caused, much like the test in Bolton 
v Stone mentioned above. If the information available to the producer does not indicate that 
there is a risk of harm, i.e. that the information can discover the defect, then it cannot be said 
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that the producer would have known about the risk. It was put forward in Commission v UK 
that this requirement meant being able to show that “it was impossible, in light of the most 
advanced scientific and technical knowledge objectively and reasonably obtainable and 
available, to consider that the product was defective”210 and this was accepted. While the 
defence has been upheld, it is still not entirely clear what it means. Mildred writes: 
 
“the competition of interpretation is between absolute undiscoverability and 
undiscoverability by reasonable means. Proponents of the first maintain that 
the second would reduce the regime of the Directive to one of negligence. 
Proponents of the second refer to Recital 7 to the Directive which establishes 
a fair apportionment of risk between producer and consumer as the bases for 
the defences available to exonerate the producer and argue that the narrow 
interpretation, entailing a requirement to provide a worldwide negative, would 
deprive the defence of any practical effect.”211 
 
In interpreting this element of the defence, we either admit that the CPA is simply rebranded 
negligence and retains tests of reasonableness, or we take a hard-line approach and expect the 
highest, near-impossible standard of thoroughness. This apparent divide may not be quite as 
accurate as Mildred makes it sound. Pugh and Pilgerstorfer, commenting on Abouzaid v 
Mothercare, note that as soon as there is a possibility of discovering the defect the producers 
can no longer use the defence.212 In Abouzaid the court held that the producers could not rely 
on the scientific defence, saying that “there was no difficulty in discovering the defect by a 
simple practical test … no advance in scientific or technical knowledge since 1990 was 
required to enable that test to be carried out. The only reason that it was not carried out before 
1990 was that manufacturers (it seems) had not thought of doing so.”213 This demonstrates a 
fairly high threshold for the defence, and proves the objective standard applied to the test. 
While there are elements of reasonableness and responsibility, they are assessed objectively, 
giving us a clear distinction from negligence. The defence does not seek to ask if the producers 
had acted reasonably to consider the particular risk involved and then act upon it, otherwise it 
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is entirely possible the producers may not have been held liable in this instance. The general 
state of knowledge was sufficient to uncover that a faulty elastic strap may result in injury if it 
slips or breaks.  
 
A similar approach was taken in A v National Blood Authority, where it was found that 
although it was agreed that a screening test to discover Hepatitis C in the blood did not exist at 
the time214 the fact that the risk was known by the producers disqualified them from being 
absolved under the defence.215 Both A v National Blood Authority and Abouzaid demonstrate 
fairly harsh approaches to the understanding of discoverability. In A the defect couldn’t be 
uncovered but it was known, and in Abouzaid the defect wasn’t known but could easily have 
been discovered. It is hard to say that the producers in these cases weren’t acting reasonably, 
solidifying further that the reasonableness the defence uses is not necessarily as lenient as the 
reasonableness we see in negligence. It is a reasonableness more closely associated with those 
in professions with an added duty of care, such as doctors and employers. Prior to hearing A v 
National Blood Authority, Stapleton discussed the Thalidomide disaster in relation to creative 
leaps and discoverability, and observed that once you are willing to hold that a defect is 
discoverable despite there being no research or reason for testing to have been undertaken to 
prove its existence, it will be impossible to ever demonstrate that a defect was 
undiscoverable.216 Indeed, Hodges notes that “knowledge of certain observed facts at the time 
the product was put into circulation does not imply that all conclusions which might 
subsequently be postulated, deduced or proved from those facts are ‘discoverable’ at that 
time.”217 Both these observations are reasonable comments to make, and especially in the 
aftermath of Abouzaid and A v National blood Authority one may question what information 
would not be considered ‘known’ or ‘discoverable’. It would appear that both these cases are 
strong support for limiting the ambit of reasonableness in this defence. Only risks which are 
undiscoverable in the strictest sense seem to fall under the defence. Although the inclusion of 
the phrase ‘might be expected’ in the CPA’s defence suggests a wider reach for reasonableness, 
it seems clear that the courts are maintaining a high threshold for success to ensure producers 
act according to the highest standard, and yet still allowing protection where totally unexpected 
risks do develop. 
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5.2: Should the scientific defence remain? 
 
 As we have seen in the last section, the scientific defence is not met without challenges 
and controversy. On one hand we need the defences to ensure producers are not prevented from 
taking risks in innovation, but on the other it seems to place the burden for those risks on the 
consumers. Many are satisfied with the present balance of risk; Hodges argues that it is 
appropriate for consumers to bear some level of risk if they are interested in sharing the rewards 
of innovation.218 Innovation, after all, does not often happen for its intrinsic value. Producers 
will always be improving their products for profit, to make more marketable and appealing 
products, so it only makes sense that the wider community bears a small risk if the producers 
get caught off guard with unforeseen issues. This argument runs the risk, however, of creating 
a culture where consumers are taken advantage of because they too reap the benefits of 
experimental products. This is what Mildred and Howells suggest in response to Hodge’s 
defence of the producer. They argue that the very nature of the CPA demonstrates that 
producer’s interests are not paramount, and this should not be forgotten.219 The producer stands 
to gain just as much, if not more, than the consumer, so it is difficult to use the community 
argument that Hodges presents to suggest that producers be able to develop freely without 
consequence. Having said that, the defence, as we have seen, requires a high threshold and it 
is not often that it will be utilised. The directive was created with a fair apportionment of risk 
in mind, and in a 2006 review of the directive the commission did not believe the directive 
required amending,220 suggesting that they feel this balance is being met.  
 
 Despite what appears to be a reasonable compromise between producers and 
consumers, The European Consumer Organisation, the BEUC, is calling for abolition of the 
development risks defence.221 They are not alone in this sentiment; Mildred and Howells also 
suggest that the only solution to correct the inherent issues with the defence would be to remove 
it.222 Of course, this ‘solution’ hinges on whether or not one believes there is a problem that 
ought to be redressed. Because the CPA covers a multitude of industries, it is entirely possible 
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that it feels far too restrictive in some areas and not strict enough in others. If we are to add 
AVs to the industries subject to the CPA, how will it contribute to this discussion? First, 
looking at the knowledge requirement, the pioneering nature of an entirely new field of research 
is both a blessing and a curse: producers have very little information to work with and so having 
an understanding of potential defects is severely limited, however this does provide an almost 
too easy defence. Newdick’s comments about difficulties with knowledge only located in 
closed-door papers and memorandums223 seem fitting here; producers, in attempts to remain 
competitive, keep their research close to their chests and as a result there may not be as much 
knowledge sharing as is necessary for the overall safety of the field. Will information 
uncovered by one developer mean another developer can no longer utilise the defence, even if 
that information remained internal to the company? Because the leading AV developers are 
thoroughly scrutinised by the press some of these potential dilemmas may be mitigated, but it 
doesn’t remove the risk entirely. It may be necessary to enforce publication requirements for 
new developments to ensure all developers have access to the most advanced knowledge 
possible. Otherwise the balance of risk may certainly be unfairly resting on consumers. Howells 
observes that in high tech industries the producers are also the leading researchers, so access 
to knowledge is likely to be less of an issue,224 so it may be that these concerns are for naught 
if producers are publishing and sharing their research with each other.  
 
 On the issue of discoverability, we encounter a similar problem. Just as we face a 
general lack of knowledge because of the nature of the field, we also face an inability to 
‘discover’ every new issue that will arise. The barrier producers will face, however, is that they 
will technically have the ability to discover the vast majority of defects. The majority of the 
incidents AVs have been involved in have been due to a lack of foresight – the producers simply 
have not tested every possible variable. One of the first major deaths caused by an AV crash 
was due to the vehicle being unable to distinguish between a trailer and the colour of the sky.225 
Another unusual predicament AVs have encountered has been difficulty in reading road lines 
in areas with poor markings or roadworks with temporary lanes.226 These things are not due to 
technological limits, but just an unforeseen consequence of asking a finite amount of code to 
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interact with an infinite number of variables. Soudi discusses the problem of AVs inevitably 
having to interact with humans on the road, and such interactions not always being 
predictable.227 While AVs can be programmed to read road signs, lane markings, and traffic 
signals, can they be programmed to understand what Soudi calls the ‘language of driving’? 
Will they be able to differentiate between the contextual meanings humans attach to flashing 
lights and beeps of the horn? Moreover, will these incidents be considered defects and, if so, 
were they ‘discoverable’? Many of these errors are not outwith the technological capacity of 
AVs or producers, it would seem that in these cases the producers simply were not aware they 
would become problems so didn’t include code to handle it. If we follow the precedent given 
in Abouzaid, it would seem that producers will not be able to utilize the scientific defence in 
these scenarios because they had not thought of running the algorithm against these issues. 
However, this almost seems counter intuitive to the purpose of the defence. The scientific 
defence was included in the CPA to provide producers with a defence against unexpected risks. 
Given the infinite number of variables encountered when asking a program to interact with the 
world it will not be possible to test every eventuality in advance. The producers have built a 
system which they believe is sufficiently adaptable to the most commonly encountered 
scenarios, and it does not seem just that they should be penalised for failing to foresee the 
future. Of course, while the UK courts are obliged to consider Abouzaid, there is nothing 
preventing them from overturning the ruling or adapting the law if necessary, but the case has 
established a strong precedent from which the courts will not easily deviate.  
 
 Are these concerns sufficiently arduous that they would justify removing the defence? 
It would not seem so. While there are legitimate concerns surrounding the scientific defence, 
we have not seen it used frequently enough to understand the practical effects of its existence. 
Additionally, the mere existence of the legislation itself will act as a deterrent for producers 
not engaging in the most thorough research possible to eliminate any potential risks, so the lack 
of cases is almost an indication of its effectiveness in ensuring a higher standard of product 
safety. The literature discussing the defence’s removal is mostly hypothetical and, while 
arguments from principle are extremely valuable, unless these theories can be demonstrated it 
is unlikely that the UK Government will take any action. Because the main sources of the 
defence’s limits have come from case law, it is not altogether impossible to adapt it, within 
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reason, as new scenarios unfold. Technological development has progressed considerably since 
Abouzaid and it may be that the approach to discoverability in 2000 is no longer workable 
almost twenty years later.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 The introduction of a technology so pervasive as AVs will no doubt come with many 
challenges, both foreseeable and unexpected. To attempt to create a programme capable of 
executing a skill as complex and variable as driving is no small feat and in isolation is a 
testament to the capabilities of technology today. While we ought to spend time marvelling at 
the accomplishments of the developers of this technology, they are not excluded from being 
subject to our laws and regulations. Society has spent so long fantasising about how 
revolutionary AVs are and how much our lives will change because of them that it has almost 
forgotten that progress does not happen in a bubble. AVs are being tested on our roads and are 
interacting with an unsuspecting public, with the assumption that the autonomous technology 
is limitless in its abilities. The string of accidents in recent years has perhaps enlightened us to 
the danger these vehicles will pose throughout their evolution and reminds us that technology 
is not infallible. We must remove ourselves from the optimism and wonder of progress and 
consider what happens when everything fails. This thesis has sought answers to that very 
question in relation to product liability laws, and what is immediately clear is that the journey 
is far from over.  
 
 We first looked at theories of delictual liability to establish the meaning of fault in our 
legal system. The two underlying theories of loss and responsibility guide all our legislative 
decisions, whether overtly or not. The idea behind creating a strict liability scheme for product 
liability was to remove the elements of fault from the legislation to focus on rectifying loss in 
all but the most exceptional of circumstances. However, as we saw, neither theory is sufficient 
on its own: responsibility regimes cannot always rectify harm where there are gaps or overlaps 
in who is responsible, and loss regimes do not account for non-economic losses suffered. We 
see these tensions play out in the CPA, where we see fully strict liability where defective 
products cause damage, and yet we also maintain defences to ensure that producers have some 
opportunity to escape liability if the damage was truly unavoidable or unattributable. The issue 
of software updates perfectly encapsulates the difficulties balancing loss and responsibility. 
The AEVA places responsibility for updating software on the owners of the vehicles so they 
will bear the burden of liability if they choose not to update the technology. While well 
intended, this shifts the responsibility for maintaining the highest level of technology onto the 
consumers and provides an easy way for manufacturers to evade responsibility for outdated 
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software. However, it may not be just to require manufacturers to be responsible for lazy 
consumers, and it is clear that such black-and-white legislation will not fare well in the long 
term. There will inevitably be circumstances which were not contemplated by the legislators 
and it may be harder to amend legislation in light of new information than to create flexibility 
to allow for legal as well as technological progress.  
 
 The other major facet of fault discussed was the limits of the reasonable driver. There 
are many issues of causation which will undoubtedly arise as a result of AVs functioning at L3 
(see fig.1.1), and the legislation ought to reflect these complications. We have observed a 
difficulty in balancing loss and responsibility as the government reports wrestled with whether 
a fault-based regime would remain most suitable to handle driver responsibility. While 
acknowledging the unique difficulties faced at this point in the development, no changes were 
made, suggesting either a reluctance to fully consider the present complications or a failure to 
consider how long we may remain in this intermediate period. If we recall Waldron’s story 
about Fate and Fortune (where two identical actions resulted in Fate causing an accident and 
Fortune evading, purely by luck) we understand why a fault-based regime, particularly with 
the current level of AVs, will prove complicated and potentially unjust. However, it is 
important to remember that this concern is specific to the duration of the AV development 
process, and should society reach a point where all vehicles are fully autonomous with no driver 
input, then there will no longer be a need for fault on the roads. However, a responsibility to 
be forward-thinking should not be at the expense of present issues, and not addressing how to 
rectify a potential imbalance of fault is an oversight. This discrepancy between loss and 
responsibility will be seen in negligence if claims of fault are brought against AV users, but 
may also be seen in the assessment of software updates as set out in the AEVA.  
 
 Next, we took a closer look at the CPA to analyse the meaning of defect, the burden of 
proof, and how we adequately assess consumer expectations. What is immediately apparent is 
that there are considerable hurdles to overcome when this question is inevitably raised in 
relation to AVs. Because the test for defect grounds itself in the public’s expectations of safety, 
we have an incredibly inconsistent approach to AVs and a consumer opinion that may be wildly 
inaccurate. As fig.1.1 helps demonstrate in the introduction, automation is not an all-or-nothing 
concept, but it is not apparent that the public are aware of this fact. Large groups of the public 
will be far too faithful in AVs abilities, while other pockets of people will be inherently 
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distrustful because of a lack of control. Given that statistically, people tend to perceive a lack 
of control as carrying a greater risk, this creates a public opinion which is varied, inconsistent, 
and inaccurate. Which of these groups are we to use as guidance for the ‘general opinion’? It 
may result in the courts choosing the group which most aligns with their own personal view if 
there is not one obvious opinion which dominates the public sphere.  
 
Adding to these discrepancies is a series of potentially conflicting judgments about how 
much proof is required to show that a product is defective, and moreover what elements of the 
defect are required to be proven. This complication will be multiplied with a product as 
complicated as an AV, especially if a coding error is to blame for the damage. To add to this 
lack of clarity, it is also not certain whether the ruling in Boston Scientific will apply to AVs, 
deeming all of a producer’s AVs at the same level of software defective should one of them be 
found to contain a defect. Most of these concerns exist solely because we have not had a case 
to clarify how the law will address these scenarios, however it is not in the best interests of 
manufacturers or consumers to sit around waiting for these issues to arise. While we do not 
want to confine ourselves to rules which will not apply later because of unforeseen 
circumstances, we should seek to have general rules in place to govern these issues so that if, 
and when, these cases are presented to the courts we have an idea of how the law will handle 
them.  
 
Our third issue concerned the differences between private and commercial property, 
with particular regard to how these definitions are challenged by the rise of the shared economy. 
The CPA created an exclusion for commercial property under the justification that companies 
would be in a position to insure themselves for potential damage from their products, and to 
offset those costs through small increases in price. However, a modern economic model making 
use of a shared economy challenges the divide between private and commercial property to a 
point where the exclusion in the CPA may no longer be justifiable. Ride sharing companies 
have utilized individual’s private vehicles for a commercial scheme, creating questions about 
whether these vehicles are private, commercial, or both. With the potential to add AVs into this 
mix it seems unfair that consumers would be able to claim under the CPA if they were using 
their AV in a personal capacity but would be excluded from the scheme if they were using their 
AV as part of a ride sharing scheme. It is only in a narrow category of scenarios that this issue 
becomes apparent, so it may not be necessary to overhaul the system, but it does raise questions 
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about whether we value this dichotomy over ensuring equal treatment in like cases. A 
reconsideration of this exclusion is essential for AVs to become a commonplace product on 
our streets, whether this reconsideration leads to drastic changes or a small addendum.  
The final question we asked was whether the scientific defence is still appropriate in an 
age of complicated and pioneering technologies. The scientific defence remains a controversial 
inclusion in the CPA, and many desire its abolition. The two main elements of the defence, 
knowledge and discoverability, have been given a high threshold by the courts, a threshold 
which almost makes the defence ineffective. The limits of the defence presently result in any 
information which was either known but was not discoverable (A v National Blood Authority), 
or was discoverable but not known (Abouzaid), as precluding producers from using the defence. 
Both of these judgments are viewed as fairly harsh, and they leave us wondering exactly what 
kind of defect would have to arise to qualify a producer for the defence. While this remains in 
line with the philosophy of the CPA by prioritising consumers’ interests over the 
manufacturers’, it seems that the defence is unusable despite it being established that it has a 
marginally wider ambit than that found in the original directive. However, the lack of cases 
citing the scientific defence leave that part of the legislation relatively untested, so it may be 
that these cases will become the rare exceptions as time progresses. Notwithstanding, it may 
create some concerns for AV manufacturers because it would appear that their position will 
never allow them to make use of the defence. The defects that we have seen so far in AVs have 
all been issues which were entirely discoverable, but due to an infinite number of possible 
events arising, have simply not been accounted for in the initial stages of development. 
Following the precedents currently established manufacturers are left without any way to 
defend themselves from scenarios which were, by all reasonable means, unforeseeable. It 
remains to be seen whether we want this high threshold to be maintained in the interests of 
consumer protection, or whether we find that producers feel stifled by the impossibility of 
defence. It seems ironic that a legal system which cannot account for all possible future 
scenarios has established parameters which will punish manufacturers for not being able to do 
just that. This alone may be cause to at least consider whether the scientific defence is in need 
of review given the unforeseen developments since its initiation. 
 
This assessment of the UK’s product liability laws leaves us with a mixed review. There 
are certain elements that seem to be relatively functional, while there are others that are more 
strongly impacted by the introduction of AVs and will require adjustments. The AEVA has 
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addressed many of the initial concerns about insurance, however there are yet to be 
considerations of the relevance of the private/commercial property distinctions or whether the 
scientific defence can be maintained in its current form. The solutions to these issues may 
become apparent as further testing is undertaken, more discussions are had, and other issues 
outwith product liability are resolved, however it appears that while some positive steps have 
been taken by the UK Government to ensure that the law keeps pace with technology, many 
more are needed before we see a seamless integration of AVs.  
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